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ABSTRACT
This study analyzed the extent of teachers' unions 
activities in the eleven states without favorable 
collective bargaining legislation and the impact of 
collective bargaining agreements on teachers' wages, 
employment rates, and per-pupil expenditures. 
Specifically, school districts were examined in the six 
states which authorize, but do not require collective 
bargaining, and the five states which have no 
legislative provisions concerning collective bargaining 
for teachers. School districts were examined if 
student enrollment exceeded 10,000.
A two-phased methodology was used to address the 
research questions. Phase 1 was a qualitative study 
which utilized data from a survey of school 
superintendents in selected districts in order to 
obtain information concerning teacher labor relations. 
Survey instruments were distributed to 106 school 
superintendents of which 83 responded. Data from 82 
districts were analyzed. Phase 2 was a quantitative 
study utilizing multiple regression techniques to 
examine the statistical relationship between teachers' 
union activities and teachers' wages, employment rates, 
and per-pupil expenditures within the school district.
The results of the qualitative study indicate 
that teachers' unions are actively engaged in
collective bargaining with school boards even though 
school boards are not required to do so. Approximately 
thirty percent of the school districts were engaged in 
collective bargaining with the majority of collective 
bargaining contracts first being negotiated in the 
1960s and 1970s. The rating by superintendents in 
districts without collective bargaining of teachers' 
level of concern for four financial and five 
educational reform issues suggest that the demand for 
the services provided by teachers' union exist in these 
districts.
The empirical results of Phase 2 of the study 
indicate that collective bargaining significantly 
increases wages by approximately 9 percent compared to 
nonbargaining districts. The effect of a collective 
bargaining agreement on employment rates was estimated 
to be approximately 39 percent. The effect of 
collective bargaining on per-pupil expenditures was 
found to be less statistically significant and was 
estimated to be approximately 9 percent. The effect of 
endorsements of school board candidates by teachers' 
unions, however, was statistically insignificant in the 
three equations.
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Background of the Study 
Although public sector union membership and 
collective bargaining coverage have remained constant 
in most occupations, teachers' unions have experienced 
significant growth during the 1980s (Freeman & 
Ichniowski, 1988). The two major teachers' unions, the 
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the National 
Education Association (NEA), presently represent over 
90 percent of the nations' teachers. Additionally, 
over 68 percent of the country's local school districts 
are covered by formal collective bargaining agreements 
(Freeman, 1986). Local school boards throughout the 
nation generally have similar missions, but the labor 
relations between school board and teachers vary 
considerably based on state laws, local customs, and 
citizens' attitudes towards unions.
Mo st research on public sector union growth 
emphasizes the role of protective bargaining 
legislation (Moore, 1977; Moore 1978; Reid & Kurth, 
1984; Ichniowski, 1984; and Saltzman, 1985). Although 
some researchers reject the view that these laws are 
the primary cause of public sector union growth 
(Burton, 1979; Burton & Thomason, 1988), studies 
demonstrate the importance of collective bargaining
laws to union formation and growth. For instance, Zax 
and Ichniowski (1990) find that duty-to-bargain laws 
significantly increased the probability of bargaining 
union formation of local governmental departments 
between 1977 and 1982. They argued that the changes in 
unionization attributed to duty-to-bargain laws were so 
large that they accounted for nearly all of the 
differences in average unionization rates between 
states with and wi thout these laws. Similarly,
Saltzman's (1985) study of the cause and consequences 
of the growth of teacher unionism concludes that 
bargaining legislation provides a major impetus to 
union growth.
Researchers have attempted to characterize and 
code state collective bargaining laws on the basis of 
their favorableness toward collective bargaining. The 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Public 
Sector Collective Bargaining Law Data Set provides a 
comprehensive source that describes the status of state 
public sector collective bargaining policies from 1955 
to 1985 (Valletta & . Freeman, 1988). The data set 
identifies seven types of labor relations which 
characterize the collective bargaining rights afforded 
public employees. Specifically these are: duty to
bargain (explicit), duty to bargain (implied), right to 
meet and confer, right to present proposals, employer
authorized but not required to bargain with unions, 
collective bargaining prohibited, and no legal 
provisions.
As of 1991, thirty-three states mandate or 
strongly foster collective bargaining agreements in 
public education by the passage of duty-to-bargain 
laws. Six states authorize but do not require 
bargaining with teacher unions. Five states present 1 
have no legislative provisions governing collective 
bargaining, but contain districts which have adopted 
collective bargaining contracts. Six states have 
legislative provisions which prohibit collective 
bargaining. As expected, school districts in states 
with duty-to-bargain laws or prohibitive bargaining 
legislation retain no local option regarding requests 
by teachers' union for collective bargaining.
A second factor often discussed as an important 
determinant of public-sector union growth is the 
increase in employee demand for union services. The 
increase in demand for union services centers on the 
belief that public employees were dissatisfied with 
employment conditions. Employees joined unions in 
anticipation that union membership and collective 
bargaining would provide an instrument to alleviate 
this dissatisfaction (Ashenfelter & Pencavel, 1969;
Scoville, 1971; Bain, 1970; Moore & Newman, 1975; 
Dalton, 1982).
Teachers' demand for union services is influenced 
by economic and non-economic conditions in the school 
district. Although teachers' salaries may be modest 
compared to private sector employees, teachers 
generally enjoy extensive job security and good fringe 
benefits. The effects of reform legislation which 
changed t enure r ights and cert i f i cat ion, along with 
inadequate salary increases, may increase the degree of 
job dissatisfaction which may affect union demand for 
union services. Additionally, school systems which are 
experiencing fiscal difficulty must consider options 
such as reduction-in-force, reduction of salaries and 
benefits, and changes in working conditions in order to 
meet financial obligations. The adoption of these 
policies might also increase demand for union services.
Finally, the level of employer opposition to union 
organizing is sometimes identified as a factor to 
consider when examining the growth of public sector 
unionism. Government employer resistance to union 
growth is usually considered modest when compared to 
the intensity of employer opposition in the private 
sector (Freeman, 1980; Freeman, 1988). Four main 
reasons have been given for the lack of public sector 
employer resistance (Freeman, 1988). First, public
sector workers constitute an especially active 
political group, which is able, at the ballot box, to 
punish or reward politicians who are their employers, 
even though public sector workers generally are only a 
small proportion of voters. Second, the cost of 
illegal opposition is likely to be greater for public 
than for private officials, because public officials 
who break laws are more likely to face removal from 
office. Third, unions can help public sector employers 
increase budgets through lobbying for additional public 
sector expenditures. Fourth, union wage premiums tend 
to be smaller in the public sector than in the private 
sector. In short, management opposition to unions can 
gain profits in the private sector, but can cost votes 
in the public sector.
The sentiment of the community toward unions is 
reflected within the local school board and this 
directly influences the degree of resistance which a 
school board may attempt. If given an option, 
employers such as school boards would rather operate 
without the restraints and procedural requirements of a 
collective bargaining agreement. When local school 
districts are not required by law to engage in 
collective bargaining, a unions' ability to organize 
teachers and to obtain a collective bargaining 
agreement will be based on the teachers' demand for
6union services, and the school boards' lack of 
resistance to unions.
Research Questions
Three question are examined in this study.
1. What is the extent of teachers' union activity 
in large school districts in the eleven states without 
favorable collective bargaining legislation?
2. What are the prospects for future growth of 
teachers' unions in large school districts in the 
eleven states without favorable collective bargaining 
1egi s1 at ion?
3. What is the impact of collective bargaining 
agreements on teachers' wages, employment rates, and 
per-pupil expenditures in large school districts in the 
eleven states without favorable collective bargaining 
legislation?
Significance of the Study
This study will provide statistical information 
(e.g., number of requests for certification elections, 
number of elections conducted, the results of 
certification elections, number of collective 
bargaining agreements) for those states without 
favorable educational labor relations legislation. 
Information concerning local school boards and
teachers' unions labor relations is not compiled in 
those states that have not enacted educational labor 
relations legislation. Since the focus of the AFT and 
the NEA has been on the adoption of collective 
bargaining contracts for its members, this study will 
indicate whether teachers' unions have been able to 
obtain collective bargaining rights for their teachers 
in states that lack favorable collective bargaining 
1egis1 at ion.
Second, this study will investigate the 
superintendent's perception of teachers' concerns with 
financial and educational reform issues which may 
affect the demand for union services by teachers. Even 
though collective bargaining rights are not guaranteed 
by legislation, teachers within these states join 
professional associations and unions. The 
superintendents' perception of teachers' concerns may 
provide insight into the potential future demand for 
union services in the states without favorable 
collective bargaining legislation.
Third, prior research of public sector 
negotiations suggest that the presence of a collective 
bargaining agreement significantly affects wages, 
employment, and expenditures (Freeman, 1986; Ehrenberg 
& Schwarz, 1986). This study will examine the effects 
of collective bargaining on wages, employment, and
per-pupil expenditures in states without favorable 
collective bargaining legislation. Since local school 
districts are not required to negotiate with teachers' 
unions, the impact of collective bargaining may differ 
from previous studies.
Finally, trends in labor relations in public 
education at the district level may precede changes in 
public sector labor relations legislation within the 
states which presently have not enacted favorable 
legislation. As unions gain status within a state 
through the adoption of collective bargaining 
agreements with local school boards, the union is more 
capable of lobbying for a change in state legislation 
which would be more favorable to union advancement. 
Since 1984, for example, the states of Ohio and 
Illinois have changed their public sector legislation 
from an employer authorized status to duty to bargain. 
Similarly, in 1992, a bill mandating duty-to-bargain 
legislation was passed in New Mexico. This study may 
provide insight into the prospects for future changes 
in educational collective bargaining legislation in the 
six states which presently authorize school boards to 
negotiate, but does not require collective bargaining, 
and the five states which presently have no legislative 
provisions establishing collective bargaining 
agreement s .
CHAPTER 2 
OVERVIEW OF TEACHERS’ UNIONS AND 
THEIR IMPACT ON EDUCATION 
History of Teachers' Unions 
The organization of teachers began in the 1840s as 
state associations. These state teacher associations 
first lobbied for the passage of state laws affecting 
teacher benefits, including tenure rights, single 
salary schedules, and ret i rement programs for teachers. 
Historically, many state teacher organizations rather 
than state departments of education assumed 
respons ibi1i ty for maintaining state educat ional data 
(Cresswel1, Murphy, & Kerchner, 1980) . In 1857, ten 
state teacher associat ions joined to establish a 
Nat i onal Teachers' Association (NTA). The N T A 's major 
objective was to upgrade teaching into a profession, 
but their organization experienced little success in 
achieving this goal in its early years.
National Education Association (NEA)
In 1870, the NTA became the NEA by becoming an 
umbrella organization within which four departments-- 
Normal Schools, Higher Education, Superintendence, and 
Elementary Education— were affiliated. In 1884, the 
NEA used widespread publicity to improve attendance at
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its annual meeting as a means of membership 
recruitment. The landmark 1884 meeting also created 
the National Council of Education which served as the 
governing board of the association. This council, 
limited to a small number of the nation's leading 
educators, quickly became the most powerful and 
respected part of the NEA. This group of leaders also 
controlled the NEA presidency throughout the rest of 
the century (Urban, 1982).
Throughout the early history of the NEA, the most 
powerful and influential group of teachers was the 
public school teachers in Chicago. Led by teachers 
Catherine Goggins and Margaret Haley, the Chicago 
Teachers Federation was able to secure enough money 
from taxes to pay teachers a fair salary. This was 
accomplished when the Illinois Supreme Court ruled in 
favor of the Chicago Teachers Federation concerning 
taxation for public education. This dramatic 
accomplishment was duplicated by teachers organizations 
in New York and other cities.
Beginning in 1903, Haley began to challenge the 
NEA leadership council over teacher issues. Since the 
leadership council was composed mostly of male 
administrators and professors, most issues relevant to 
teachers were not placed in high esteem. By organizing 
teachers within the NEA, the first woman president,
Ella Flagg Young, was elected. After this election, 
the NEA gave increasing attention to classroom 
teachers, endorsing higher salaries, equal pay for 
equal work, and woman suffrage. Moreover, the 
establishment of the Department of Classroom Teachers 
in 1912 initiated discussions on the issue of teachers' 
advisory councils, which were to advise superintendents 
on school policies (Cresswel1, et a l . , 1980). The 
influence of these advisory counci1s was determined by 
the superintendent, but many suggestions important to 
teachers were implemented.
By 1920, however, the conservative leaders of the 
NEA began restructuring the organization to prevent 
groups like the Chicago Teachers’ Federation from 
taking control. The establishment of a representative 
assembly made up of delegates representing state and 
local education associations structured the association 
along professional lines. The NEA's chief executive 
officer was a professional administrator who was hired, 
not elected, to run the organization. The basic 
direction and character of the association was 
established, and it steadily advanced in terms of 
membership, wealth, and power. The NEA continued to 
become the association for all professionals in 
education. Through the establishment of departments 
representing educational groups, the association
gradually added staff and executive secretaries to 
serve its members (Murphy, 1990).
During the 1970s and 1980s, the NEA's emphasis 
shifted to national politics. In 1976, the NEA 
endorsed a candidate for the office of the President of 
the United States for the first time. It supported 
Jimmy Carter in both 1976 and 1980 and Walter Mondale 
in 1984. Ronald Reagan's victory and his 
Administrations' endorsement of tui t ion tax credi ts by 
his administration created an antagonistic relationship 
between the NEA and the President. During the 1980s, 
the NEA supported federal legislation that would have 
guaranteed collective bargaining rights to all 
employees in public schools, colleges, and universities 
(Stern, 1988). The U. S. Secretary of Education, 
William Bennett, strongly opposed this proposition.
The NEA was often criticized by the Reagan 
Administration as preventing meaningful reform in 
educat ion.
Membership in the NEA has increased to include 
nearly 86 percent of all teachers. In addition to 
providing membership to support personnel in order to 
encourage increased membership, the NEA adopted other 
measures. First, the NEA required affiliated 
associations to pay dues to the national organization. 
Second, the NEA encouraged state organizations to
require its state members to belong to the national 
organization. Beginning in 1944, Oregon became the 
first state to unify its membership. By 1972, the NEA 
required joint membership of all its affiliates. This 
drive increased membership, strengthened the national 
office, and increased local chapter membership in 
cities (Murphy, 1990). Membership figures for the NEA 
for 1900 to 1990 are presented in Table 2.1.
American Federation of Teachers (AFT)
On April 15, 1916, three of the Chicago Teachers' 
Unions and one local association from Gary, Indiana, 
met to form a new national teachers' union. By May 9, 
eight local associations were affiliated and then 
received into the American Federation of Labor as the 
American Federation of Teachers (AFT). Though the 
teachers' desire to affiliate with organized labor in 
the United States was never in doubt, the AFL's 
platform was revised to include its support of free 
public schools.
The impetus for the formation of the AFT was 
threefold. First, leaders in these cities recognized 
the necessity of a national organization of teachers 
and valued the support of organized labor. Second, 
teachers were unhappy about their working conditions.
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Table 2.1. 
to 1990
Membership of the NEA by Decade from 1900
Year Membership Increase
1900 2,332 1,267
1910 6,909 4,571
1920 52,850 45,941
1930 172,354 119,504
1940 203,429 31,075
1950 453,797 250,368
1960 713,994 260,197
1970 1,100,155 386,161
1980 1,680,566 580,411
1990 2,057,286 376,720
Source: National Education Association, NEA Handbook,
1991-92, p. 139.
Third, teachers believed the NEA. had failed to address 
teachers' grievances. The leaders of the Chicago 
Federation of Teachers discovered that the 
administrators who were resisting their attempts to 
secure better working conditions were the same ones 
running the NEA.
The AFT adopted a conventional union model. Two 
primary national officers were elected, a president and 
a secretary-treasurer. All executive funct ions were 
performed by these officers rather than an executive 
staff. Leaders of AFT locals serve as unpaid national 
officers and guide the AFT activities between 
conventions.
As indicated in Table 2.2, by 1920 the AFT had 
over 10,000 members. At this time, the NEA became 
concerned that the dignity of the profession was being 
threatened through association with organized labor.
The NEA, therefore, organized an anti-union campaign 
directed by its influential deans of education, 
professors, and state superintendents against the new 
teachers' union movement which resulted in a decrease 
in AFT membership (Coleman, 1990). Additionally, 
during this period the AFT was struggling for its 
identity due partly to the divergent character of its 
large urban locals and partly to its emphasis on
16
Table 2.2. 
to 1990
Membership of the AFT by Decades from 1916
Year Membership Increase or 
Deer ease
1916 1,500
1920 10,000 8,500
1930 7,000 -3,000
1940 30,000 23,000
1950 41,000 11,000
1960 59,000 18,000
1970 205,000 146,000
1980 551,000 346,000
1990 774,000 223,000
Source: Adapted from Allan C. Ornstein and Daniel U.
Levine, Foundations of Education, p. 61.
social and economic reform rather than on educational 
issues. Unlike the NEA, which devoted most of its 
attention to educational matters, the AFT spent a great 
deal of time discussing social and philosophical 
issues. For example, the AFT was in the forefront of 
the civil rights movement, and the role and rights of 
women in education (Cresswel1, et a!., 1980).
Today, the over 800,000-member AFT is the primary 
union of teachers in major cities such as New York, 
Chicago, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Minneapolis, Denver, 
and Baltimore. The AFT has approximately 2,200 local 
unions representing teachers, paraprofessionals, and 
health-care employees (Stern, 1988).
Bargaining Rights for Teachers and 
Teachers' Unions 
Eaton (1975) reported that the first teachers' 
contract was signed in Cicero, Illinois in 1944. By 
1958, however, collective bargaining was rare and only 
six contracts existed. These contracts were found in 
Connecticut, Illinois (2), Montana, Rhode Island, and 
Wisconsin. Prior to this time, the NEA had resisted 
collective bargaining and the AFT had not been 
successful in organizing its members. Memberships in 
both organizations desired professional status similar
to that of doctors and lawyers rather than blue-collar 
type labor relations.
The most consequential certification election for 
unionization occurred in 1960 for the teachers in New 
York City. This election marked the first direct 
confrontation between the AFT and the NEA concerning’ 
bargaining representation. The AFT had adopted its 
organizing techniques from the AFL-CIO and was 
significantly aided by the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union 
Department (IUD). The AFL-CIO assistance of two 
organizers and a pledge of $250,000 secured the AFT 
success in the representative election. The victory by 
the AFT, however, helped transform the NEA from a 
professional association dominated by school system 
administrators into a labor union. The NEA was forced 
to seek collective bargaining rights for teachers since 
whenever the AFT was successful in a certification 
election, NEA membership in the district would decrease 
due to exclusive bargaining rights. The contract won 
in 1962 by the AFT is recognized as the spark which 
resulted in the development of teacher bargaining 
elsewhere.
Increases in the number of collective bargaining 
agreements between teachers' unions and local school 
boards have corresponded with the adoption of favorable 
state educational labor relations legislation.
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Legislation granting collective bargaining rights was 
first enacted in Wisconsin in 1959 and most 
industrialized states followed by the end of the 1960s 
(Stern, 1988). Table 2.3 presents the status of state 
law concerning teachers bargaining rights as of 1992.
Within the thirty-three states characterized as 
duty to bargain states, union representation is 
determined by an election of union members according to 
state law. Typi cally, state 1egislat ion speci fying the 
rules and regulations is modeled after the Taft-Hart1ey 
Act, and labor agency procedures are generally 
patterned after the National Labor Relations Board.
When union officials believe that considerable 
union representation is obtained, they will ask the 
school board to be recognized as the bargaining agent 
for the teachers. If the school board grants the 
request, negotiations for the first collectively 
bargained contract can begin. If the school board 
refuses, the teachers may petition the state public 
employee relations board for an election. The 
petitioning union must prove that membership in the 
union is for the purpose of representation in 
collective bargaining.
State laws typically require at least 30 percent 
of the membership to request union representation. The 
state public employee relations board may request proof
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Table 2.3. Bargaining Rights for Teachers by State, 
1992 (Updated by Author).
Duty to Bargain (33 States)
Alaska Cali fornia Connect icut
Delaware Flor ida Hawai i
Idaho *111 inois Indiana
Iowa Kansas Maine
Maryland Massachuset ts Mi chigan
Minnesota Montana Nebraska
Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey
New York North Dakota *Ohio
Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania
Rhode Island South Dakota Tennessee
Vermont Washington W i scons in
Collective bargaining prohibited (6 States)
Alabama 
Georgi a
North Carolina 
Virginia 
South Carolina 
.Texas
Employer authorized but not required to bargain 
(6 States)
Ar i zona 
Arkansas 
Colorado 
Kentucky 
Louis iana
New Mexico (Changed to Duty to Bargain in 1992)
No bargaining provision (5 States)
Mississippi 
Mi ssour i 
Utah
West Virginia 
Wyoming
Sources: Adapted from Robert G. Valletta and Richard
B. Freeman. The NBER Public Sector Collective 
Bargaining Law Data Set. Summary of State Labor Law. 
Bureau of National Affairs. March, 1981.
Illinois statute enacted in 1985.
Ohio statute enacted in 1983.
of membership in the union as verified by membership 
list, dues deduction cards, and membership application 
cards. The teachers' union must also show that the 
school board has declined a request by the union to be 
recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent.
Next, the school board is notified by the state 
public employee relations board that the union is 
petitioning for representation. Typically, a 
conference with the union officials and the school 
board is arranged to discuss the petition. The school 
board may agree to union representation or request an 
election. Details of the election such as the 
appropriate bargaining unit, voter eligibility, ballot 
type, time, and place for the election are mutually 
agreed upon by the teachers' union and the school 
board. Areas of disagreement are typically resolved 
through a hearing procedure by the state public 
employees relations board.
Representation elections are usually held within a 
specified number of days of the initial petition 
according to state law. The election is conducted by 
representatives of the public employees relations 
board. A majority of the voting employees (50 percent 
+ 1) must favor representation before the union can be 
certified (Leap, 1991).
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Frequently locals of the two major teacher 
organizations attempt to represent the teachers within 
the district. State law usually requires whether a 
simple majority or a majority of the voting employees 
is necessary in order to declare which organization 
will represent the teachers.
The lack of a state collective bargaining statute 
does not necessarily mean that teachers cannot organize 
or bargain. Since few jurisdictions actually make it 
illegal for school boards to enter into a bargaining 
relationship with teachers, most teachers have the 
right to enter into an enforceable collective 
bargaining agreement. However, the school board is in 
a stronger position to resist the concerted efforts of 
teachers if it decides to do so (Leap, 1991).
According to Leibig and Kahn (1987):
The difference between jurisdictions with a 
collective bargaining law and those without a law 
is that in the latter, no matter how much the 
employees support a union and let the employer 
know of this support, the employer does not have 
to deal with any union, except if the employer 
chooses to do so. And the employer can pretty 
well establish the ground rules on which it will 
deal with unions. For example, the employer can 
decide whether it will voluntarily recognize a 
union or will require an election. The employer 
can decide whether it will deal with the union as 
a representative of its members only or as an 
exclusive representative of all people in a 
"bargaining unit". Also the employer can 
unilaterally define the appropriate bargaining 
unit if there is no statute, (p. 81)
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Empirical Finding’s on the Growth 
of Teachers' Unions
Prior research on teachers' unions has attempted 
to answer the question, who joins teachers unions? 
Rosenthal (1966) examined the determinants of 
membership in the AFT in New York City and Boston 
during the early 1960' s . He reported that men, less 
experienced teachers, teachers in large schools, and 
teachers in 1arge black or Puerto Rican populations 
were more 1ikely to be union members. Cole (1968) 
studied teachers in New York City and reported that 
union members were more 1ikely to be male, young, or 
Jewish. Hel1reigel, French, and Paterson (1970), 
surveying t eachers in the Seat 11e area, conf i rmed 
the finding that members were mostly young males.
These studies, generally, analyzed teacher's decisions 
to join a union and ut i1ized r egress ion techniques.
Moore (1978) analyzed the determinants of teacher 
unionism and collect ive bargaining by examining the 
membership of both the AFT and the NEA. Moore 
conducted two types of analys i s : 1) t ime ser i es
regression using nat ional aggregate data from 1919- 
1970, and 2) cross-sect i on regress ion us ing state-level 
data in 1969 and 1970. The percentage change in AFT 
nat ional membership and percentage change in NEA 
national membership were used as the dependent
variables. Both dependent variables were found to be 
positively correlated with the percent increase in 
consumer prices. He found no significant relationship 
between AFT and NEA membership changes and the 
percentage of teachers who were male, the percentage of 
teachers covered by collective bargaining laws, or the 
membership of the trade union movement.
Moore's cross-section regressions utilized four 
dependent var iables: AFT membership, NEA membership, 
written agreements, and comprehensive agreements. Both 
AFT and NEA membership variables had a significant 
positive relationship to teachers' relative income (the 
average salary of teachers divided by the average 
earnings of production workers). Teachers' relative 
income, however, was not significantly related to 
either written agreements or comprehensive agreements. 
The degree of urbanization had a significant, positive 
relationship with written agreements and comprehensive 
agreements, but not with either AFT or NEA membership. 
Location in the South had a significant negative 
relationship with written agreements. The fraction of 
teachers who were male was insignificant for all four 
of the cross-section regressions, just as it was for 
both of the time series equations.
Saltzman (1982) criticized Moore's study, arguing 
that representing the growth in AFT membership from
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1919 to 1970 in a single model was inappropriate 
because the character of the AFT had changed from a 
association which was affiliated with a trade union to 
an advocate of the concept of collective bargaining. A 
similar problem was cited in Moore's time series and 
cross-sect ion regressions for the NEA membership. His
conclusion states: "Clearly, for the NEA as well as
the AFT, different models are needed to explain 
organizational membership during different phases in 
the organizations' histories" (Saltzman, 1982, p. 200).
The language Moore used to distinguish between 
written agreements and comprehensive agreements is also 
cited by Saltzman as a weakness. The definition of 
written agreements was used to encompass both 
collective bargaining contracts and procedural 
agreements between the local school board and the 
organization. Saltzman stated that the vagueness of 
the operational definitions used to distinguish between 
the various types of contracts places doubts on the 
results of Moore’s study.
In an attempt to improve the time-series and
cross-section models developed by Moore, Saltzman 
analyzed state level data for 1959-1978 to determine 
whether the growth of teacher unionism during those 
years was primarily a result or a cause of public
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sector bargaining laws adopted during that period. The 
time-series regression incorporated the following 
independent variables: bargaining laws, teacher/school
characteristics, labor market conditions, membership in 
other unions, and attitudes toward unions.
Saltzman concluded that changes in the percentage 
of teachers covered by collective bargaining contracts 
were positively related to the enactment of bargaining 
laws. Fur ther, Salt zman found that causali ty runs in 
both directions, but bargaining laws appear to have a 
much greater impact on the extent of bargaining than 
the extent of bargaining has on bargaining laws.
Saltzman's findings also indicate that male teachers 
and teachers from large employment units are more 
likely to start bargaining, than female teachers and 
those from rural districts.
In summary, initial research on teachers' union 
growth centered on micro-level studies attempting to 
identify characteristics of teachers who join unions. 
Union members were generally identified as being men, 
less experienced teachers, and teachers in large school 
districts. More recent studies have indicated the 
importance of labor relations legislation to secure 
collective bargaining agreements and the demand by 
teachers for union services. These studies typically 
utilize macro-level data in order to explain the growth
of teachers' unions both at the national and state 
levels.
The Impact of Teachers' Unions
There are two arguments to describe the impact of 
unions on employment related issues. On the one hand, 
unions are viewed largely as monopolies in the labor 
market whose primary economic impact is to raise 
members' wages at the expense of unorganized 1abor, and 
at the expense of the efficient funct ioning of the 
economy. Many economists stress the adverse effects of 
union work rules on productivity, the loss of 
employment in the organized sector due to union wage 
increases, and the crowding of the nonunion sector with 
displaced workers. Additionally, management frequently 
complains about inflexible operations and work 
disruptions caused by unions.
On the other hand, some economists argue that 
unions have beneficial economi c and poli t ical effects. 
Industrial relations experts have long stressed the 
ways in which collective bargaining can induce better 
management and higher product i vi ty. Unions can 
increase the development and retent ion of ski 11s, 
provide informat ion about the operati ons of the 
business, improve morale, and pressure management to be
more efficient in its operations. These benefits are 
typically referred to as "voice" effects of unionism. 
(Freeman & Medoff, 1984).
Since the late 1960s, researchers have attempted 
to study the process and effects of teachers’ unions. 
The monopoly face effects of unions have been 
researched to document the effects of unions on teacher 
salaries and fringe benefits. Effects of collective 
voice have centered on teacher and administrat ive 
practices, school governance, worker attitudes, and 
school reform. These numerous studies have resulted in 
contradictory evidence, while utilizing considerable 
variations in research design and techniques.
Monopoly Face Effects of Unionism
Researchers attempting to describe the monopoly 
effect of union workers examine the differences in 
salaries and fringe benefits between union and nonunion 
teachers. Four reviews of union wage effects studies 
for teachers reached the same basic conclusion (Cooper, 
1982; Cresswell & Spargo, 1980; Finch & Nagle, 1984; 
Lipsky, 1982): unionism has a positive but small
effect on salaries. An exception to these finding is 
the work of Baugh and Stone (1982) who found that 
teachers' unions increase teachers' salaries by as much 
as 21 percent. In addition, studies of perceptions of
teachers, superintendents, and school board members 
indicate that collective bargaining has positive 
effects on salaries and fringe benefits (Salter, 1986, 
Rogers, 1988, and Kersey, 1986).
In comparison to the number of studies on the 
effects of collective bargaining on wages, the effects 
of collective bargaining on employment and expenditures 
is relatively unexplored. In the private sector, it is 
commonly accepted that one of the responses to uni on 
wage effects is a reduction in employment (Freeman, 
1986). Eberts (1984) reported that collective 
bargaining had positive effects on the student-teacher 
ratio but he failed to estimate the size of the 
effects.
Chambers (1977) reported that collective 
bargaining did not have a statistically significant 
effect on educational expenditures, but he noted that 
his research was carried out on a relatively small 
cross-section sample of school districts in only one 
state. Gallagher (1978) studied the school budgets of 
133 Illinois school districts and noted a 9 percent 
differential in total operating expenditures between 
bargaining and nonbargaining districts. His research 
suggests that unions have increased nonsalary benefits 
such as medical and dental insurance, retirement, 
social security, unemployment insurance, disability
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insurance, life insurance, and teacher leave 
provisions. Although these costs are usually not 
reported as wage increases, they can represent a 
substantial increase in expenditures for school 
districts.
Collective Voice Effects of Unionism
In contrast to the extensive research examining 
the effect of collective bargaining on teachers’ 
salaries, relatively few studies have examined the 
effect of collective bargaining on working conditions. 
Teacher unions typically bargain for contracts which 
protect the individual teacher, while providing the 
teacher an environment to maximize productivity. 
Consequently, teacher contracts are very explicit in 
certain areas such as the grievance procedure with 
binding arbitration, working conditions, and seniority 
benef its.
Freeman (1980) first showed that union workers are 
less likely to quit their jobs than nonunion workers, 
even when wages and other factors are held constant. 
Rees (1991), using data on New York State public school 
teachers from the mid-1970s, found that teachers with 
the two strongest types of grievance procedures in 
their collective bargaining contracts had a lower
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probability of quitting than those working under weaker 
grievance procedures.
Generally, teachers have preferred bargaining for 
grievance procedures with binding arbitration which 
allows for a third party to resolve disputes arising 
under the collective bargaining agreement. Schnaufer 
(1967) reported that slightly more than one-fourth of 
the 88 sample contracts had substantive provisions 
mandating binding arbitration, whereas Goldschmidt, 
Bowers, Riley & Stuart (1984) found that four out of 
five large districts' contracts negotiated in 1984 
contained provisions subjecting contract disputes to 
binding arbitration.
The concept of the use of teacher time is 
frequently interwoven with bargaining over money. Over 
the past 25 years, teachers have bargained not only 
over the length of their contract year, but also over 
the number of work days allocated to classroom 
instruct ion (Goldschmidt & Painter, 1978). In 
addition, teachers have bargained contract provisions 
on the allocation of time within the workday, such as 
maximum number of lesson preparations, limits on 
clerical work or duties, and sufficient preparation 
time. According to Eberts and Pierce (1980), teachers 
in bargaining districts spent more time than teachers 
in nonbargaining districts on nonteaching activities
such as preparing lessons, performing clerical duties, 
and meeting with parents.
The role of seniority in determining promotions, 
involuntary transfers, and layoffs has also been 
expanded through bargaining. Perry (1979) found that 
seniority has played a greater role than performance in 
promotions and layoffs in union districts than in 
nonunion districts. Six of the nine systems he studied 
used seniority as the sole criterion for layoffs.
In 1976, Murphy and Hoover speculated whether 
unions and collect ive bargaining would increase the 
bureaucratic character of schools, resulting in 1 ess 
flexibi1ity and less professional behavior among 
teachers, or if bargaining would enhance professional 
autonomy. Their research suggests that collective 
bargaining had both effects depending on the local 
conditions. McDonnell and Pascal (1979) reported that 
collective bargaining had no effect on classroom 
operat ions, but improved staff mo r a 1e and provided 
teachers greater autonomy. When t eachers1 percept i ons 
are compared to pr incipals, super intendents, and school 
board members, teachers indi cate a more posi t i ve 
percept ion of the outcomes of co11ect ive bargaining 
(Staver, 1986).
Eberts (1984) examined the effect of col 1ect i ve 
bargaining on several factors known to be determinants
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of student achievement utilizing data from a national 
survey. He concluded the net effect of collective 
bargaining on teacher productivity was not clear at 
this time since the effects of collective bargaining 
were both negatively and positively associated with 
determinants of students achievement. Kurth's (1987) 
model using aggregate macro-level data concluded that 
teachers' unionization contributed to the decline in 
SAT performance of students. In contrast, Eberts and 
Stone (1984, 1987) report higher standardized test 
scores for students of average ability in unionized 
environments. Similarly, Grimes and Register (1991) 
reported that black students who attended unionized 
schools score 13.11 percent above the black SAT mean. 
These findings suggest a positive productivity effect 
of collective bargaining for teachers which 
significantly benefit students.
In conclusion, teachers’ unions were organized to 
improve conditions related to wages and the working 
environment. Teachers' unions typically believe that 
the best method to accommodate these needs is through a 
collectively bargained contract with the school board.
Although not governed by federal legislation, a 
majority of the states have established educational 
labor relations acts which enable teachers to unionize 
and enter into collective bargaining contracts. A
majority of studies analyzing the growth of membership 
or collective bargaining conclude that the type of 
collective bargaining legislation significantly impacts 
union membership. Unfortunately, no attempts have been 
made to examine teachers' union growth in those states 
without educational labor relations legislation.
As for the impact of teachers' unions, studies 
center on the monopoly face of unions, examining the 
impact of unions on economic issues such as wages and 
fringe benefits. Most studies conclude that the 
presence of a collective bargaining agreement has a 
positive effect on wages, with the effect as small as 3 
percent and as large as 21 percent. Studies typically 
utilizing district level data within one state prior to 
the passage of duty-to-bargain legislation have 
attempted to measure the impact of collective 
bargaining on employment and expenditures.
Studies on the collective voice effects of 
unionism emphasize the importance of working conditions 
to improve productivity. Union teachers working under 
strong grievance procedures are less likely to quit 
their jobs. Additionally, union contracts provide 
teachers benefits such as job security by establishing 
seniority as the basis for promotion, transfers, and 
layoffs. Finally, researchers studying the effect of
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collective bargaining on student achievement have 
reported both positive and negative results.
CHAPTER 3 
THEORY RELATED TO THE GROWTH 
AND IMPACT OF UNIONS 
Demand and Supply Model of Union Services 
Application of the conventional demand and supply 
framework to union growth conceptually began with 
Berkowitz (1954). He described trade unions as a 
seller, not of labor power, but of memberships in the 
organi zat ion. Uni ons, similar to bus inesses, receive 
revenues, incur expenses, and should operate at a 
marginal profit. Subsequent studies by Ashenfelter and 
Pencavel (1969), Pencavel (1971), and Ashenfelter and 
Johnson (1972) expanded the concept that viewed 
unionism as an asset that provides a flow of services 
to utility-maximizing workers. These services are 
considered both private and collective goods for the 
individual.
Within the Ashenfelter/Pencavel model (1969), the 
demand for union services is dependent upon the 
relative price of union services (p ) , permanent income 
or wealth (w), the union-nonunion compensation 
differential (diff), the price of substitutes for union 
services (s), any net nonpecuniary benefits from a 
unionized environment (NP), and taste toward unionism 
(t).
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In equation form, demand for union representation 
is given by
= f ( p, w, diff, s, NP, t),
where
U'p <0 and U ’w , U'diff , U*s , U ’Np >0.
The supply of union services, U s , can be expressed 
as a function of the relative price (p), the cost of 
union organizing (CO), the costs of providing and 
maintaining services to existing members (CS), and 
union goals (G). The supply for union services can be 
expressed as
U s = g ( p, CO, CS, G ),
where
U ’p > 0 and U'cs , U*co < 0.
In the simple market-clearing model, the 
equilibrium level of unionism, U, will be determined by 
the interaction of demand and supply so that
U = U d = U s .
Since the equilibrium level of unionism (U) and 
the price of membership (p) are functions of all of the 
other variables within the system, the reduced form for 
the union demand and supply model becomes
U = h ( w, diff, s, NP, t, CO, C S , G ) .
In practice, however, these variables are seldom 
measured directly. Economists and industrial relations 
experts typically utilize this demand and supply
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framework either explicitly or implicitly, when 
developing models to explain union growth.
Two major perspectives have developed attempting 
to trace the changes in union membership and union 
density. Some scholars have explained union growth 
focusing on historical, economic, legal, psychological, 
sociological, and political variables. These macro- 
level studies attempt to identify the primary factors 
whi ch influence growth and decline of 1abor unions. 
Others have focused on the importance of individuals' 
decisions to join a union. These micro-level studies 
analyze the individual unionization-related behavior of 
workers which affects the membership in unions. The 
primary focus on these studies is on factors increasing 
the demand for unionization.
Macro-1evel Determinants of Union Growth
Most explanations of union growth begin with an 
appraisal of the role of shifts in the structure of 
employment and its effect on the demand for union 
services. Specifically, changes in union growth are 
attributed to increases or decreases in traditionally 
highly unionized sectors and employment expansion in 
traditionally nonunion sectors. This hypothesis has 
been stated in terms of industries, occupation, gender, 
and full-time/part-time status. Theorist are attracted
to the structural shift hypothesis because of its 
straightforward and non-accusatory notion that some 
workers are simply union prone while others are not. 
Critics of the market shift hypothesis suggest that 
this approach involves macro-level analyses of micro- 
level premises about workers' decisions based on taste 
toward unionism.
Economists attempted to explain union growth and 
dec 1ine in terms of the bus iness eye 1e . For examp1e , 
Commons, et al ., (1918) explained union membership 
growth as occurring in times of economic prosperity, 
whereas membership declines occurred in times of 
economic hardships. Numerous models explain union 
growth in terms of cost of living, unemployment rates, 
and average weekly wages based on the theoretical 
framework affecting the demand for union services.
In general, these t ime-ser i es analyses indicate 
that increases in wages, prices, and employment lead t 
an increase in the demand for union services, while 
rising unemployment inhibi ts the demand for union 
services (Fiorito & Greer, 1982) . Critics contend, 
however, that insufficient attention is paid to the 
dynamics of union growth and the importance of 
soc i opoli t i ca1 c1imat e (Dun 1 o p , 1948) . Although it is 
generally recognized that union growth is procyclical, 
the business cycle fails to explain within-country
differences in density rates and cross-country trends 
in union membership.
The legal environment for collective bargaining 
has been shown to be an important determinant of union 
growth and decline because it affects the cost of 
organizing workers. Specifically, labor laws regulate 
employer opposition to unions, establish union 
recognition procedures, and promote union security.
Also labor laws may affect union density through a 
"substitution effect" by providing nonunion employees 
with benefits previously available only through unions 
(Neumann & Rissman, 1984).
More recently, employer opposition to unions has 
been recognized as an important determinant of changes 
in union density rates (Freeman, 1989). Employer 
resistance, such as discriminatory discharges of union 
supporters and refusals to bargain with certified 
unions, can result in negative net nonpecuniary effects 
of joining a union. A greater assertiveness during 
collective bargaining negotiations, and the development 
of human resource management strategies which promote 
alternatives to unionism, result in increased costs of 
maintaining services to union workers (Chaison & Rose, 
1991). Additionally, employers frequently employ 
substitutes for union workers, including contracting
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out for services and the use of part-time and temporary 
employees.
Another factor that has been used to explain the 
growth and decline in unionization is public attitude 
toward organized labor. Researchers have suggested 
that the degree of public acceptance toward unions may 
influence the ability of unions to recruit new members 
(Bok & Dunlop, 1970). Lipset's (1987) analyses of 
pol1ing data revealed that the decline in public 
approval of unions was correlated with decreases in 
overall union density and with the union success rate 
in certification elections. Evidence suggests, 
however, that public attitudes alone explain only a 
small proportion of within-country and cross-country 
density rates. For example, Freeman (1986) observed 
that public approval of unions was steady between 1972 
and 1985 when union density fell sharply.
Researchers have recognized that union membership 
and union density are affected by such major events as 
wars, economic depression, and the passage of 
comprehensive labor laws. Typically, union membership 
expands during wartime because of the increase in the 
cost of living and the shortage of the labor supply.
The pivotal importance of major events is the central 
premise in the "historical" approach to the study of 
union growth.
Price and Bain (1989) recently argued that between 
periods of institutional development and periods of 
institutional consolidation exist critical turning 
points affecting union growth. These turning points 
introduce periods of union development by radically 
altering the institutional arrangements surrounding the 
employment relationship. A major contribution of the 
Price and Bain theory is the distinction between the 
two peri ods of union evo1ut i o n . Trad i t i ona1 models of 
union growth fail to explain union membership trends 
during times of institutional upheaval and renewal. 
During incremental change, models remain useful to 
explain fluctuations in union membership (Chaison &
Rose, 1991).
Micro-level Determinants of Union Growth
While macro-level models emphasize both sides of 
the demand and supply equation, micro-level models 
emphasize the demand for union services by the 
individual. Many researchers believe that the central 
issue of the collective action of unionization lies in 
the individual decision to support or join the union. 
According to Wheeler and McClendon (1991), studies 
examining individual workers' decisions to join a union 
can be organized under three main headings.
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The first type, Model A, utilized the works of 
Fest inger (1957) explaining cognitive dissonance 
theory. It posits dissatisfaction as setting in motion 
a search to end the uncomfortable dissonance between 
what is desired by the worker and what is actually 
obtained. It then shows the employee making a 
judgment as to whether supporting a union would obtain 
the wished-for level of employment-related outcomes, 
thereby ending the dissonance. If the employee 
believes these wage and nonpecuniary benefits will 
result when he joins a union, the demand for union 
services will increase.
Model B is derived entirely from utility theory.
In this second model, increases in the demand for union 
services will result whenever an employee chooses to 
support a union based solely on whether doing so would 
have posi t ive ut i1i ty. Uni ike Model A, the employee is 
not requi r ed to exper i ence di ssonance to put the 
decision process in mot ion. The image of employee 
decision making used here is one of the constantly 
calculat ing individual who will act to suppor t a union 
whenever the expected increase in wages or nonpecuni ary 
benef its exceeds the cost.
The third model, Model C, descr ibes the unioniza- 
t ion decis ion affect ing the demand for uni on services 
based entirely on political and ideological beliefs.
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Unlike the other models, the decision to join a union 
by an employee is not represented by a rational 
decision making process. The inclusion of Model C as a 
major theoretical framework stems largely from the view 
of scholars that ideology and class feelings play a 
role in union supporting behavior. This model 
exemplifies the importance of an employee's taste 
toward unions as a factor in the decision making 
process.
In order to test these models, scholars frequently 
rely on a number of factors as correlates to the 
individual’s decision to support union formation.
These variables are frequently analyzed in order to 
explain union certification election results.
The relationship between job satisfaction and union 
voting behavior is the most frequently examined issue 
in individual-1 eve 1 studies (Premack, 1984). Fiorito, 
Gallagher, and Greer (1986) concluded that a negative 
relationship has been consistently found between a 
prounion decision and the level of job satisfaction.
The evidence, however, is mixed with respect to whether 
particular facets of job satisfaction are more 
important than others. Economic aspects of 
satisfaction are more likely to be related to the 
unionization decision than other issues related to job 
satisfaction.
Occupation of the employee has been included in 
most individual level studies. Researchers generally 
conclude that white-collar workers are more difficult 
to organize than blue-collar workers (Fiori to & Greer, 
1982). Typically, researchers tend to avoid 
generalizations by occupations.
The attitudes of employees toward unions have been 
among the more heavily researched determinants of 
unionization. Two groups of independent variables are 
utilized by researchers to analyze employee's attitude 
toward unions. First, there is a set of variables 
which are various measures of union image and 
att i tudinal predisposi tions toward unions. This 
includes general attitudes about unions, attitudes 
about specif ic unions, perceived union corrupt ion, and 
percept i ons of union power (Kochan, 1979; Schriesheim, 
1978; and Hills, 1985). Second, there is a set of 
var i ables whi ch measure workers' percept i ons of the 
effect iveness of unions in generat ing des i red out comes. 
This is commonly referred to as perceived union 
instrumentali ty (Premack & Hunter, 1988; Montgomery, 
1989).
More recently, studies have examined how normative 
or social pressures influence an individual worker's 
decision to vote for uni on cert i f i cat i on. Workers' 
perceptions of how referent others wished them to vote
have been found to have a significant effect on their 
voting intentions (Youngblood, DeNisi, Mol lesion, & 
Mobley, 1984). Similarly, Zalesny (1985) found that 
individuals who believe that social forces favored 
unionization were more likely to vote for a union. 
Montgomery (1989) concluded, after studying public 
university clerical workers, that influence of other 
workers, family members, and immediate co-workers had a 
significant effect on intent to vote for union 
formation, whi1e the view of supervisors did not.
Researchers studying the impact of demographic 
variables on union growth have hypothesized that 
younger workers are more 1ikely to support unionizat ion 
than older workers, that female workers are less 1ikely 
to unionize than male workers, and that non-whi te 
workers are more likely to support unionization than 
whi te workers. The reasoning behind these predictions 
has included such explanations as younger workers are 
more mi 1itant than older workers, women appear to be 
averse to aggressive union activities, and blacks are 
presumedly more prone to co11ective social action.
The research results of the effects of age, sex, 
and race on union format ion, however, are mixed. Some 
studies (Farber & Saks, 1980; Bigoness, 1978; and Maxey 
& Morhman, 1980) have cone 1uded that younger workers 
are more prone to support a union, while Kochan (1979)
found no support for the claim. Race may be the one 
demographic variable for which substantial support 
exists (Kochan, 1979; Farber & Saks, 1980; and Fior i to, 
Gallagher, & Greer, 1986). In contrast, studies 
indicate that education (Vo os, 1983), mar 1 1&1 status 
(Hi 11s, 1985), and rural background (Farber &  Saks, 
1980) have a negligible effect on union formation.
In summary, the demand and supply framework 
constitutes the basis for subsequent research 
explaining the growth of unions. Macro-level models 
emphasize both the demand and supply factors based on 
historical, economic, legal, or political variables. 
Micro-level models emphasize the demand for union 
services based on the individual's decision to 
part icipate in union activities.
Demand and Supply Model 
for Municipal Labor Markets 
The impact of teachers' unions on wages, 
employment, and expendi tures are typi cally placed in a 
demand and supply model of municipal labor markets. 
These models are often used in studies focusing on 
uni on effects in the public sector (Freeman, 1986; 
Ehrenberg &  Schwarz, 1986).
In these models, demand for public employees is 
derived from the demand for government services.
Demand for government services is generally specified 
to be a function of the price of the service (p) , the 
community's "taste" for the service (t), and the 
community's ability-to-pay (a). Public sector unions 
are viewed as using their political power to raise the 
demand for public services (Freeman, 1986); thus, the 
presence of a union (u) represents an important 
component of the demand function. In equation form 
DL = f ( p ,  t, a, u ) .
Similarly, the supply of public employees is 
specified to be a function of the price of the service 
(p), the availability of workers having the skills or 
desire to work in various government occupations (s), 
and the favorableness of alternative employment 
opportunities (e). In equation form 
SL = f ( p, s, e).
Using the demand and supply equations, the reduced 
form for municipal wages (W) can be written as:
W = f ( t, a, u, s, e).
Changes in employment rates and expenditures are 
affected by the same components (Valletta, 1989).
Public employee unions are presumed to alter the 
labor demand through the use of political influence 
over the budgetary process. If public unions are able 
to win settlements to the right of the municipal labor 
demand curves, both wage and employment outcomes will
be greater than in the absence of unionism.
Furthermore; by affecting wage and employment outcomes, 
municipal unions are likely to increase municipal 
expenditures (Valletta, 1989).
The variables which represent the components of 
the equations for wages, employment, and expenditures 
will be presented in Chapter 4.
CHAPTER 4 
DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY
This study examines labor relations with teachers' 
unions in large public school districts in states 
without favorable collective bargaining legislation. 
Districts in Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, and New Mexico were selected because local 
school districts are authorized but not required to 
bargain with teachers' unions. In addition, districts 
in Mississippi, Missouri, Utah, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming were also selected because these states do not 
have statutory bargaining provisions.
School distri cts with students enrollments over
10,000 were selected for the following reasons: (1)
teachers' unions frequently target 1arger schoo1 
districts to ini t iate union act ivi t ies due to decreases 
in organizing costs, and (2) larger school districts 
wi thin a state are ident if ied as models for other 
districts. If union activity is present wi thin a 
state, it should be evident in the larger districts. 
Addi t ionally, most states contain a cons iderable number 
of school districts with less than 1,000 students.
Although the 106 1ocal school districts represent 1 ess 
than 6 percent of the total number of school districts 
in those states, they serve over 30 percent of the 
student membership.
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Data Collection
Two types of data were used in this study: local 
school district data obtained by surveying school 
superintendents and district data obtained from various 
government publications.
Survey Instrument
A survey was conducted of 106 superintendents from 
public school districts with student enrollments of
10,000 or more in the eleven selected states. The 
survey was intended to provide the following 
information concerning the school district: (1) the
1abor relationship between the teachers1 unions and the 
school board, (2) average teachers' salary and per- 
pupi1 expendi ture, (3) the superintendent's percept ion 
of teachers' concerns of financial and educational 
reform i ssues and (4) the super intendent's percept ion 
of the unions' endorsement of school board candidates.
There were several reasons for this focus. First, 
since these school districts are located in states 
wi thout publi c sector col 1ect ive bargaining 
legislation, there is no source, such as a state 1abor 
relat ions board, to obtain the frequency of collective 
bargaining requests and certification election results. 
Second, teachers’ salary and per-pupi1 expendi tures in 
the districts as reported by state departments of
education cannot be compared since these are not 
reported consistently by the states. Third, the 
superintendent's perception of teachers' concerns with 
financial and educational reform issues may provide 
insight into future demand for union services by 
teachers. Lastly, the literature is relatively void of 
information concerning teachers' unions political 
activities wi thin the states wi thout favorable 
collective bargaining legislation.
A review of the literature provided sample surveys 
of school administrators and teachers concerning union 
membership and collective bargaining (Kerchner & 
Mitchell, 1980; Stewart, 1980; Boulter, Leonard, & 
Williams, 1989). An item pool was established based on 
these surveys and an initial prototype of the survey 
instrument for this study was prepared. The developed 
instrument was then presented to district level 
administrators to establish face validity. The survey 
was revised to include a question requesting a 
description of a critical or key incident which may 
have resulted in union growth in the district.
Survey instruments (See Appendix A) were mailed in 
June, 1992 to the selected school superintendents. A 
second mailing was made to nonrespondents three weeks 
later. A total of 83 completed surveys were returned 
for a response rate of 77.4 percent.
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Table 4.1 shows the total number of school 
districts, the number of school districts included in 
the sample, and the number of school districts which 
responded by individual state. One school district was 
eliminated since the student enrollment was presently 
below 10,000 students. Data from 82 school districts 
were analyzed.
Table 4.2 presents the information by sampled 
states comparing the number of teachers employed in the 
state, the mean of teachers employed per district, and 
the mean of teachers employed in the districts 
surveyed. Superintendents reported the total number of 
teachers employed in the school system during the 1991- 
92 school year. The mean for all surveyed districts 
was 1,443 teachers employed.
Table 4.3 compares the average salary of teachers 
in the state to the mean of the salaries reported by 
superintendents for the teachers in their district.
The mean for all responding districts was $29,935. 
Generally, the average salary reported by the 
superintendents in the surveyed school districts were 
more than the average salary statewide. One 
explanation for this occurrence is salaries are 
traditionally higher in metropolitan areas as compared 
to rural areas due to the higher cost-of-living.
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Table 4.1. Comparison of Surveyed States Total Number 
of Districts, Total Number of Surveyed District, and 
Total Number of Respondent Districts.
State Total Districts Surveyed Respondents
1 2 3
Ar i zona 219 19 12
Arkansas 324 2 2
Colorado 176 16 14
Kentucky 177 4 4
Louis iana 66 21 18
Mississippi 151 5 5
Missouri 543 12 10
New Mexico 88 5 2
Utah 40 12 9
West Virginia 55 8 5
Wyoming 49 2 1
Totals 1888 106 82
Source: Column 1 from National Education Association
1991-92 Estimates of School Statistics, (1992),
Table 1, p. 35.
Column 2 from: Arizona Department of Education,
Statistical and Financial Data for Fiscal Year 1989-90; 
Arkansas Department of Education, Annual Statistical 
Report of the Public Schools of Arkansas: Colorado 
Department of Education, Colorado Education and Library 
Directory 1990-91; Kentucky Department of Education, 
Prof iles of Kentucky Public Schools: Fiscal Year 1989-
90; Louisiana Department of Education, The 140th Annual 
Financial and Statistical Report; Department of 
Education of Mississippi, Annual Report of the State 
Superintendent of Public Educat ion; Department of 
Education of Missouri, The 1988-89 Report of the Public 
Schools of Missouri: New Mexico Department of
Education, The 1990-91 New Mexico Educat ional Personnel 
Pi rectory; Utah Depar tment of Educat ion, Summary of 
Stat ist i cal and Financial Data of the State 
Super intendent of Publi c Instruct ion 1989-90; Wes t 
Virginia Department of Educat ion, West Virginia Annual 
Report 1989-90. Vol II; Wyoming Department of 
Educat ion, Wyoming Educat ion Directory. 1990-91.
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Table 4.2. Total Number of Teachers Employed and 
Average Number of Teachers Per District in Sample 
States Compared to Mean of Number of Teachers Employed 
in Respondents' Districts.
State Number of
Teachers
Employed
Mean of 
Teachers per 
Distr i ct
Mean of 
Survey 
Respondents 
N=82
1 2 3
Ar i zona 34,648 158 1,017
Arkansas 25,997 80 703
Colorado 32,826 186 1,665
Kentucky 37,160 211 2,399
Louisiana 45,401 688 1,689
Mississippi 27,824 184 972
Missouri 53,304 98 1,142
New Mexico 15,458 176 817
Utah 17,941 449 1,191
West Virginia 21,039 383 1,148
Wyoming 6,014 122 881
Source: Column 1 from U.S. Department of Education,
(1991) Public and Private Elementary and Secondary 
Education Statistics: School Year 1991-92, Table 7,
p. 7. Column 2 from author's computation.
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Table 4.3. Teachers' Average Salary in Sample States 
Compared to the Mean of Respondents' Districts.
State Average Salary Mean of Respondent 
Districts 
N=82
1 2
Arizona $31,892 $33,310
Arkansas 26,569 29,535
Colorado 32,926 34,427
Kentucky 30,880 31,250
Louisiana 27,087 24,789
Mississippi 24,428 26,947
Missour i 28,880 33,875
New Mexico 26,653 24,141
Utah 26,524 26,479
West Virginia 27,298 29,282
Wyoming 29,000 29,898
Source: Column 1 from National Education Association
1991-92 Estimates of School Statistics. (1992), p. 13.
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In order to obtain information concerning the 
school district's total expenditures, superintendents 
were requested to supply the total per-pupi1 
expenditures for the school year 1991-92. The mean for 
all reporting districts was $3,716. Table 4.4 presents 
the average districts' expendi ture per pupi1 in each 
state compared to the districts surveyed.
Information concerning the frequency of requests 
for certification elections, certification election 
results, and negotiated col 1ective bargaining 
agreements was obtained from the survey instrument.
Addi t ionally, informat ion concerning the date of such 
occurrences was analyzed in order to describe current 
unionization and col 1ective bargaining practices.
The relat ionship between the schoo1 board and the 
teachers' uni on were addressed in two quest ions.
First, school super intendents were requested to 
characterize the relationship between the school board 
and the teachers' organization to determine whether a 
cooperat i ve or adversarial rel at ionship exists. 
Additionally, schoo1 superintendents were asked how 
act ively were teachers 1 union endors ing school board 
candidates.
Superintendents rated the degree of concern of 
teachers regarding four financial and five educational 
reform issues. Superintendents rated teachers’
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Table 4.4. Average Expenditure Per Pupil in Sample 
States Compared to the Mean of Respondents' Districts.
State Average Expenditure 
Per Pupil
Mean Reported by 
Respondents 
N=82
1 2
Arizona $4,417 $3,838
Arkansas 3,833 3,500
Colorado 5,172 4,224
Kentucky 4 ,039 4,125
Louisiana 4,249 3,173
Mississippi 3,155 3,046
Missouri 4,086 4,328
New Mexico 4,094 3,035
Utah 2,827 3,079
West Virginia 4,941 4,300
Wyoming 5,946 4,922
Source: Column 1 from U.S. Department of Education,
(1992), Public and Private Elementary and Secondary 
Education Statistics: School Year 1991-92, Table 12,
p .  1 2 .
concerns of salary, teacher benefits, pupil/teacher 
ratio, and declining’ local revenues. Superintendents 
also rated teachers' concerns regarding teacher 
evaluation programs, student testing, curriculum 
issues, certification requirements, and America 2000 
National Goals. This information was used to assess 
potential development of unionization and collective 
bargaining in school districts.
Archival Data
Demographic and economic data were collected from 
The Census of Population and Housing Reports (1990) 
published by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The 
average manufacturing production workers’ wage data for 
1987 was obtained from 1987 Census of Manufacturing, 
Geographic Area Survey published by the U.S. Department 
of Commerce. District unemployment data were obtained 
from the Supplement to Employment and Unemployment in 
States and Local Areas (1991) published by the U.S. 
Department of Labor. Since the percentage of public 
sector unionized workers is not available at the local 
school district level, yearly estimates of state level 
data for 1988 from Curme, Hirsch, and Macpherson (1990) 
were utilized. Regional codes were assigned to each 
school district according to geographic divisions as
defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. The variable MOUNT 
was excluded from analysis.
Table 4.5 provides a list of the variables 
included in the wage, employment, and expenditures 
analysis. Data sources, and variable definitions are 
also included. Table 4.6 provides the means and 
standard deviations for each variable. The school 
districts surveyed are separated into school districts 
with a collective bargaining agreement and without a 
collective bargaining agreement.
Research Methodologies 
A two-phased methodology was used to address the 
research questions. Phase 1 analyzed the 
superintendents' response to key incidents concerning 
teachers' unionization. Phase 2 analyzed the 
statistical relationship between teachers' unions and 
teachers' wages, districts' employment rates, and per- 
pupil expenditures.
Phase 1: Qualitative Stud.v
Key or critical incidents as reported by 
superintendents which resulted in teachers becoming 
involved in union activity were analyzed using the 
constant comparative method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Responses were unitized
Table 4.5. Dependent and Independent Variables, Data 
Sources, and Definitions.
Dependent
Variable
Data
Source Definition
InWAGE 1 The natural log of the average 
teachers1 salary of the district.
InTEACH 1 The natural log of the number of 
teachers employed in the district.
InEXPEND 1 The natural log of the district's 
per-pupil expenditure.
Independent 
Var i able
Data
Source Def ini t i on
CBA 1 The presence of a collective 
bargaining agreement between the 
school board and teachers' union.
ENDORSE 1 A measure of the superintendent's 
perception of the teachers' union 
endorsement of candidates for 
school board. The values of this 
variable are measured on a 6 point 
scale where 0 is never endorsed,
1 is extremely inactive, 2 is 
inactive, 3 is somewhat active,
4 is active, and 5 is extremely 
act ive.
PCTUNION 2 The percentage of public sector 
workers employed in the state.
UNEMP 3 The percentage unemployment rate 
in the municipality for 1991.
HOUSING 4 The median value of housing in the 
municipality.
InPCI 4 The natural log of per-capita 
income of municipal residents.
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Table 4.5: continued
Independent 
Var i able
Data
Source Defini t ion
NONWHITE 4 The percentage of municipal 
population that is nonwhite.
POP 4 The muni cipal populat ion.
PCTBS 4 The percentage of the municipal 
population that has graduated 
from college.
InOPW 5 The natural log of the average 
hourly wage of manufacturing 
product i on workers in the 
municipali ty.
WNC 4 Regional dummy variable for 
West-North Central geographi c 
division.
SATL 4 Regional dummy variable for 
South Atlantic geographic 
division.
ESC 4 Regional dummy variable for 
East-South Central geographic 
division.
WSC 4 Regional dummy variable for 
West-South Central geographic 
division
MOUNT 4 Regional dummy variable for 
Mountain geographic division.
Data Sources:
(1) from survey instrument.
(2) from M. A. Curme, B. T. Hi rsch, and D. A. 
Macpherson (1990), Union Membership and Contract 
Coverage in the United States, Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, Table 5, p. 22.
(3) from U.S. Department of Labor, (1991) Supplement 
to Employment and Unemployment in States and Local 
Areas.
(4) from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census, (1990), The Census of Population and Housing
Repo r t s ,
(5) from the U.S. Department of Commerce (1987), 1987 
Census of Manufacturing. Geographic Area Survey.
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Table 4.6. Variable Means and Standard Deviations for 
Respondent Districts With Collective Bargaining 
Agreements (CBA) and Without Collective Bargaining 
Agreements.
With CBA Without CBA
N=2 6 N = 56
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
InWAGE 10.395 .125 10.239 .146
InTEACH 7.286 .657 6.916 .561
InEXPEND 8.305 .165 8.140 .218
ENDORSE 3.462 1.655 2.375 1.712
PCTUNION 23.965 4.723 20.677 5.235
UNEMP 4.612 1.394 5.564 1.851
HOUSING 71853.846 16238.774 65526.786 17583.200
InPCI 9.494 .129 9.374 .216
NONWHITE 18.758 18.599 26.915 21.546
POP 159019.154 217966.489 92909.893 151162.867
PCTBS 22.623 10.008 22.774 9.644
InOPW 2.338 .167 2.273 .231
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on index cards such that each unit obtained only one 
characteristic. The response cards were then 
categorized into provisional categories which 
apparently related to the same content. The method of 
constant comparison resulted in three distinct 
categories. The categories were determined to be 
consistent with prior research as presented in 
Chapter 3.
Phase 2: Quantitative Analysis
Using a demand and supply model of municipal labor 
markets, separate equations were specified and 
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
analysis to determine the impact of teachers collective 
bargaining on wages, employment, and expenditures.
This is consistent with prior research (Valletta, 1989; 
Baugh & Stone, 1982; Gallagher, 1978, Chambers 1977). 
The relationship between the variables and the demand 
and supply municipal labor equations will be discussed 
in Chapter 6 when the estimating equations are 
presented.
CHAPTER 5
QUALITATIVE DISCUSSION OF UNIONIZATION 
Teachers' unions and collective bargaining became 
commonplace throughout most of the United States by 
1977 and especially in states which fostered collective 
bargaining agreements through legislation (Saltzman, 
1982). This chapter attempts to answer the question: 
What is the extent of teachers' union activity in large 
school districts in states without favorable collective 
bargaining legislation?
Unionization in States Without 
Favorable Legislation 
Teachers' unions organizing in states with 
favorable collective bargaining legislation enjoy 
significant advantages over teachers' unions organizing 
in states without favorable legislation. According to 
the demand and supply model of unionization, workers 
will join unions if (1) unions are viewed by teachers 
as a mechanism for improving various employment-related 
issues, and (2) unions supply their services to 
teachers.
Favorable collective bargaining legislation 
affects both the demand and supply side of 
unionization. First, by increasing the power of unions 
and, consequently the likelihood of establishing a
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collective bargaining agreement with the school board, 
favorable collective bargaining legislation increases 
the unions ability to affect employment conditions. 
Issues such as wages, benefits, and the operation of 
the school district are frequently subjects of contract 
negotiations. Second, teachers' unions can supply 
services to members in states having favorable 
collective bargaining legislation more efficiently due 
to the decrease in the cost of organizing and supplying 
services. Teachers' unions in established collective 
bargaining states do not experience the costs related 
to court proceedings. At the same time, they can 
profit from agency shop fees collected from all 
teachers.
In states without collective bargaining laws, 
however, unions do not enjoy power through legislative 
enactment. School boards have more freedom to choose 
how to deal with teachers' unions, particularly with 
regard to the establishment of the collective 
bargaining relationship, i.e., the cost of unionization 
increases.
This decreases the incentives for unions to supply 
their services. This does not mean teachers in these 
states do not demand union services and that unions do 
not supply their services. Teachers still demand union 
services, and the services are provided by unions
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through collective bargaining and other political 
activities. The major difference is that collective 
bargaining occurs only when allowed by the school 
board— there is no duty to bargain.
In the absence of the requirement to bargain with 
teachers' unions, how does union growth and collective 
bargaining occur? Consistent with the demand and 
supply model, teachers appear to join unions when they 
become di ssat isf i ed with present aspects of the i r 
working condi t ions. The surveyed superintendents 
reported that three broad issues were important to the 
growth in uni on membership within thei r districts: (1) 
wages, (2) job security, and (3) a voice in 
administrative decisions.
Incidents affecting salaries were identified most 
frequently by the superintendents as the key incident 
which increased teachers' involvement in unions.
Declines in t eachers salar A es in some school districts 
in Arizona, Louis iana, New Mexico, Arkansas, and 
Missouri were ident i fi ed as affect ing the growth of 
teachers' unions. Some districts whi ch provided "lower 
salary increases" to teachers also wi tnessed increased 
union act ivi ty.
One super intendent from Mi ssour i noted that when 
the school district had a large balance of funds, but 
failed to increase teachers' salaries, the result was
an increase in teachers' interest in unionization.
These incidents are consistent with the demand and 
supply model which would indicate an increase in the 
demand for union services when teachers view unions as 
a mechanism to increase or protect wages.
The second key incident most frequently described 
by superintendents was related to job security. When 
facing financial difficulties, school districts 
frequently decide to reduce the number of employees to 
decrease expenditures. Superintendents documented the 
impact of implementing reduction in force policies on 
union activity. For example, a superintendent 
indicated that due to financial difficulty in 1989, the 
district "riffed" 33 professional staff and abolished 
260 other positions. Another superintendent noted that 
when reduction in force for noninstructional staff 
personnel was implemented in 1988, the teachers 
"panicked" and began joining the union. Unions were 
perceived to provide nonpecuniary benefits to teachers 
by protecting them from the implementation of 
reduction-in-force policies.
Lastly, superintendents reported that a variety of 
administrative factors served as key incidents in the 
district which resulted in teachers demanding a greater 
voice in decision making. Teachers desiring input in 
administrative decisions, believe that union
activities will result in more shared decision making. 
For example, in response to Louisiana's comprehensive 
teacher evaluation program, superintendents indicated 
that teachers became increasingly more union oriented 
in order to repeal educational reform legislation.
Superintendents also documented the leadership 
style of previous superintendents as being a key 
incident which resulted in increased union activity. A 
superintendent of a Colorado school district described 
a former superintendent as "paternalistic" while in 
another district a former superintendent was described 
as a "new, task-oriented superintendent". Both were 
given as explanations for increased activity in 
teachers' unions. This suggest that the teachers' 
perception of the union's ability to counteract these 
developments, led to increase demand for unionization.
As a result of demand for union services, union 
membership has remained constant or increased over the 
past twenty years in states without favorable 
collective bargaining legislation. This is 
demonstrated in Table 5.1 which compares membership 
data and the percentage of teachers affiliated with the 
NEA from 1975 to 1990 in these eleven states. AFT 
membership data are not available.
Table 5.1. NEA Membership Data and Percentage of NEA Membership in 
Surveyed States Comparing 1975 to 1990.
State Number of Teachers Percentage NEA Percentage
Difference
1975 1990 1975 1990
1 2 3 4 5
Ar i zona 23,482 32,987 78.07 74.66 - 3.41
Arkansas 21,821 25,984 43.46 55.32 +11.86
Colorado 28,452 32,342 85.01 87.80 + 2.79
Kentucky 32,300 36,777 85.54 89.44 + 3.90
Louisiana 40,428 43,882 26.35 45.31 +18.96
Mississippi 24,130 28,062 22.13 34.91 +12.78
Mi ssouri 48,563 52,304 29.52 36.44 + 6.92
New Mexico 12,887 16,703 79.31 38.63 -40.68
Utah 12,952 17,884 80.21 84.77 + 4.56
West Virginia 20,175 21,476 78.40 69.42 - 8.98
Wyoming 4,991 6,784 96.77 89.92 - 6.87
Source: Column 1: U.S. Office of Education, Digest of Educational
Stat ist ics (1976) Table 48, p. 50;
Column 2: U.S. Office of Education, Public and Private Elementary
and Secondary Education Statistics: School Year 1991-92, Table 7, p. 7.
Column 3, 4, and 5: computed by author from National Education Association 
membership data contained in NEA Handbook, 1976 Table 2 ,  p. 137 and 
NEA Handbook, 1991. Table 2, p. 156.
The demand for union services created by concerns 
over wages, job security, and a desire for a voice in 
administrative decisions allows teachers' unions to 
provide services to teachers. Teachers' unions, 
however, seek to minimize operating expenses while 
attempting to increase membership. Thus, teachers' 
unions typically request collect ive bargaining r ights 
for its members so that the teachers' unions may 
operate more efficiently by engaging in a collective 
bargaining agreement.
Collective Bargaining Rights 
As is true in states having favorable collect ive 
bargaining legislation, once the teachers' union in a 
school district has obtained substant i al membership and 
status, the union typically pet i t ions the schoo1 board 
to conduct a cert i f i cat ion elect ion. Thi s elect ion is 
held to determine: (1) if a majority of the teachers
wish to enter into a collective bargaining agreement, 
and (2) whi ch t eachers1 uni on will represent the 
teachers in negot i at ions. The lack of collective 
bargaining 1egi s 1 at ion means that the school district 
has control of the process. Results from the survey 
reported in Table 5.2 indicate the frequency of 
requests by t eachers' uni ons for cert i f i cat ion
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Table 5.2. Request by Teachers' Union for 
Certification Election and Number of Elections Held 
by Decades 1960-1990 in Surveyed Districts by State,
Year(s ) Request 
for CBA 
by State
Total
Request
Elect ions 
Held
1960s Arizona (1)
Colorado (5)
Kentucky (2)
Missouri (1)
Utah (1)
1970s Arizona (2)
Arkansas (1)
Colorado (4)
Louis iana (2)
Missouri (2)
Utah (2)
1980s Arizona (1)
Colorado (1)
Mi ssour i (2)
Louis iana (1)
West Virg ini a
1990s Louisiana (1)
Missouri (1)
New Mexic o (2
10
13 10
(2 )
Totals 34 24
Total Sampled Districts 82
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elections in the districts surveyed by state across 
decades.
Thirty-four school boards received requests by a 
teachers' union to conduct a certification election. 
Requests were received by school boards in 3ach state 
with the exception of Mississippi and Wyoming. Twenty- 
four school boards conducted a certification election. 
Six school districts (Gallup and Santa Fe, New Mexico; 
Baton Rouge and Houma, Louisiana; and Morgantown and 
Clarksburg, West Virginia) refused to conduct 
cert i f i cat ion elect i ons. Four school districts (North 
Kansas City and Florissant, Missouri; and Salt Lake 
City and Ogden, Utah) voluntarily recognized the 
teachers’ union wi thout an elect ion.
Twenty-f our certificati on elect i ons were conduct ed 
which resulted in negot i at ed collective bargaining 
contracts in twenty-three school systems. Only one 
system (Springf ield, Missouri) conducted a 
cert i f i cat ion elect ion in whi ch nei ther of the two 
major teachers' unions obtained a majority vote of the 
teachers. Hence, the school board did not recognize 
either union and did not enter into collective 
bargaining. All four of the school districts that 
voluntarily recogni zed the union wi thout an e1ect ion 
entered into a col 1ect ive bargaining agreement with the 
uni on.
In general, the success in obtaining collective 
bargaining agreements during the 1960s and 1970s has 
not continued into the 1980s and 1990s. The decrease 
in union activity is similar to what has occurred in 
other public services at the federal and municipal 
levels (Freeman, 1986). The decline in requests for 
collective bargaining may reflect the adverse political 
climate in which unions have been operating in recent 
years. Alternatively, the trends may simply indicate 
that all of the organizable districts had already been 
organized by 1980.
The Future of Teachers' Union Growth 
and Collective Bargaining 
in Surveyed Districts 
Through the remainder of the 1990s, school boards 
may have to continue to operate under extreme financial 
distress while implementing educational reform which 
may affect the demand for union services. School 
superintendents were asked to provide their perceptions 
of the "level of concern" of teachers' in their school 
districts regarding nine educational issues. Financial 
concerns addressed included teacher's salaries, 
teacher's benefits, pupil/teacher ratio, and declining 
local revenues. Educational reform issues addressed 
included new teacher certification requirements,
teacher evaluation programs, curriculum issues, student 
testing, and America 2000 national goals. A rating of 
1 indicated a very low level of concern while 5 
indicated a very high level of concern by teachers.
Table 5.3 examines the superintendents' responses 
regarding the teachers' level of concern over the four 
financial and five reform issues. The data are 
separated into districts with collective bargaining 
agreements and without collective bargaining 
agreements. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed 
which determined that mean differences for evaluation 
programs was statistically significant (F=5.36; £<.05).
Generally, superintendents rated levels of concern 
of teachers of financial issues higher than educational 
reform issues. School superintendents in school 
districts without collective bargaining agreements 
rated levels of teachers concerns higher on all issues 
except salary than school superintendents in school 
districts with collective bargaining.
Teacher evaluation programs were rated by 
superintendents as of higher concern to teachers than 
other reform issues. Among all reform issues, superin­
tendents in districts with collective bargaining rated 
levels of concerns lower than superintendents in 
districts without collective bargaining. Although not
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Table 5.3. Superintendents' Perception of Teachers' 
Level of Concern in School Districts Without Collective 
Bargaining Agreements (CBA) Compared to School District 
With Collective Bargaining Agreements.
Issue Mean 
Without CBA 
N-56
Mean 
With CBA 
N=26
FINANCIAL CONCERNS 
Salary
Teacher Benefits 
Pupi1/Teacher Ratio 
Declining Local Revenues
4.69
4.35
4.11
3.85
4.73
4.35
3.81
3.77
EDUCATIONAL REFORM CONCERNS
♦Evaluation Programs 3.95
Student Testing 3.51
Curriculum 3.44
Certification 2.67
America 2000 National Goals 2.46
3.53
3.19
3.15 
2.23
2.15
♦statistically significant £<.05
statistically significant, collective bargaining 
agreements may provide teachers protection from changes 
in certification, evaluation programs, and other reform 
legislation.
The high level of concern of teachers reported by 
super intendents in school districts wi thout col1ect ive 
bargaining could indicate growth for teachers union. 
These issues are representative of key incidents 
reported by school superintendents to increase union 
activity in school districts. Specifically, issues of 
salaries and benefits, changes in certification and 
evaluation requirements, and educational reform which 
changes job expectations, could lead to increased 
demand for union services.
School districts, however, which are under 
financial restraints may not be willing to engage in 
collective bargaining with teachers unions. School 
board members and superintendents generally believe 
that collective bargaining agreements limit their 
options when responding to financial crises.
Teachers' unions frequently engage in political 
activities possibly as a substitute for collective 
bargaining. The most logical and immediate attempts 
are to influence decision making on the local school 
boards. School superintendents were surveyed to 
determine if the teachers' union had ever endorsed a
candidate for school board. Seventy-nine percent of 
the respondents indicated that the teachers' union had 
endorsed a candidate for the school board. A follow up 
question asked how active the teachers' union had been 
in endorsing school board candidates, utilizing a scale 
of extremely inactive (=1), inactive (=2), somewhat 
active (=3), active (=4) and extremely active (=5).
The mean of the superintendents' responses in districts 
with a collective bargaining agreement (M = 3 .462) is 
higher than the mean of superintendents' responses in 
districts without a collective bargaining agreement 
(M=2.375).
Teachers' unions with collective bargaining are 
more likely to participate in political activities than 
districts without collective bargaining. However, of 
those that do participate, over sixty-two percent 
reported political activity ranging from somewhat 
active to extremely active. Nearly seventy-three 
percent of the superintendents in districts with 
collective bargaining reported union endorsement from 
somewhat active to extremely active.
Additionally, superintendents were asked to 
characterize the relationship between the local school 
board and the teachers' union using a scale of highly 
cooperative, cooperative, neutral, adversarial, and
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highly adversarial. Approximately, sixty-five percent 
of the superintendents surveyed in school districts 
with or without collective bargaining agreements 
indicated a cooperative relationship between the school 
board and the teachers' union. Capitalizing on this 
positive relationship, teachers' unions may lobby 
school board members for policy changes which improve 
working conditions. Since teachers may benefit from 
this relationship, the need to establish a collective 
bargaining agreement may not result. In effect, the 
union's political activities and positive relationship 
with the school board may be a substitute for 
collective bargaining.
To summarize, superintendents in surveyed 
districts without collective bargaining reported the 
teachers' level of concern on issues such as salaries 
and job security as being greater than superintendents 
in districts with collective bargaining. Indeed, 
teachers' concerns with educational reform issues such 
as certification, student testing programs, and 
evaluation programs as reported by superintendents are 
greater in districts without collective bargaining than 
with collective bargaining. These issues have been 
identified by school superintendents as increasing the 
demand for union services.
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The survey results also indicate that teachers' 
unions in districts with collective bargaining and, to 
a large degree, in districts without collective 
bargaining, engage in political endorsement of school 
board candidates. This is important because teachers 
unions may obtain significant political power through 
the endorsement of school board candidates (Wellington 
& Winter, 1971).
CHAPTER 6 
UNION IMPACT ON WAGES, EMPLOYMENT,
AND EXPENDITURES
A research question of this study was to determine 
the effect of collective bargaining agreements on 
teachers' wages, employment levels, and district 
expenditures in the eleven states without favorable 
collective bargaining legislation.
The influence of public employee union activities 
can be placed in a supply and demand model of municipal 
labor markets (Ehrenberg & Schwarz, 1986; Freeman, 
1986). In models focus ing on union effects, demand for 
public employees is derived from the demand for 
government services. Demand for government services is 
generally speci fi ed to be a funct ion of the price of 
the service, the community's "taste" for the service, 
and the communi t y 1s abi1i ty to p a y . Public sector 
unions are generally v i ewed as us ing thei r political 
power to raise the demand for public services (Freeman, 
1986).
Abi1ity to pay and taste for government services 
can be represented by per-capita income of locai 
residents (InPCI), the median value of housing within 
the municipality (HOUSING), and the percentage of the
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municipal population which has graduated from college 
(PCTBS). Union political activity, as evident by the 
endorsement of school board candidates (ENDORSE), is 
represented by a scale from 0 to 5, where 0 represented 
that the union has never endorsed a candidate; 1 is 
extremely inactive; 2 is inactive; 3 is somewhat 
active; 4 is active and 5 is extremely active. A dummy 
variable representing the existence of a collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA) between the school board and 
the teachers' union is included in the analysis.
The supply of labor to local governments is 
typically specified as being positively related to the 
price of the services, the availability of workers 
having the skills or tastes to work in government 
occupations, and to measures of the favorableness of 
alternative employment opportunities. The average 
hourly wage of manufacturing production workers (InOPW) 
represents the quality of alternative employment 
opportunities while the unemployment rate of the 
municipality for 1991 (UNEMP) is used to represent the 
availability of alternative employment opportunities. 
The percentage of the population that is nonwhite 
(NONWHITE) is included to represent the possibility 
that workers' taste for employment in education may 
vary. Ortiz (1982) reported that minorities had
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difference beliefs, attitudes, and values concerning 
various occupations.
Three additional characteristics of the school 
district which may affect public labor markets are 
included in the estimating equations. The population 
of the municipality (POP) and the percentage of 
unionized public sector workers in the state (PCTUNION) 
are included as in previous studies. In order to 
control for regional differences, region dummy 
variables (WNC, SATL, ESC, and WSC) were also included. 
MOUNT was excluded in the analysis. (See Table 4.3 for 
definition of the variables)
Empirical Model, Estimation, and Results:
Teacher Wages 
The reduced form of the supply and demand equa­
tions for municipal labor markets can be written as: 
(equation 1) InWAGE = f (InPCI, HOUSING, PCTBS,
ENDORSE, CBA, InOPW, UNEMP, NONWHITE, 
POP, PCTUNION, WNC, SATL, ESC, WSC)
+ e .
Equation 1 was estimated using the natural log of the 
average yearly salaries (InWAGE) as the dependent 
variable in the multiple regression analysis. Ordinary 
least squares was used to obtain estimators of the 
regression parameters. The ordinary least squares
regression results for equation 1 are presented in 
Table 6.1.
As expected, the presence of a collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA) has a significant 
effect on teachers' salaries. The average annual 
teachers' salary in a district having a collective 
bargaining agreement is over 9 percent higher than 
the average annual salary in a school district which 
does not bargain. The average hourly wage of 
manufacturing production workers in the municipality 
(InOPW) and the median value of housing in the 
municipality (HOUSING) have significant effects on 
average annual teachers' salaries.
Political endorsement (ENDORSE) had a 
nonsignificant association with teachers' salaries. 
These results suggest that the political activity of 
endorsing school board candidates by teachers' unions 
does not increase wages.
To test the stability of the model, stepwise 
regression was conducted. The results, reported in 
Appendix B, indicate that the presence of a collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA), the average hourly wage of 
manufacturing production workers in the municipality 
(InOPW), the median value of housing in the 
municipality (HOUSING), and the percentage of the
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Table 6.1. Ordinary Least Squares Coefficient
Estimates for InWAGE Equation.
Var iabi e_________ Beta____________________ Standard Error
InPCI .03121 . 10617
HOUSING* 3.12301E-06 1.86769E-06
PCTBS** -4.63617E-03 2.20099E-03
ENDORSE -5.26347E-03 8.19105E-03
CBA** .09206 .02957
InOPW*** .20684 .06711
UNEMP -.01873 .01389
NONWHITE 3.12301E-06 1.867 69E-06
POP 9.00020E-08 7.63630E-08
PCTUNION 9.41026E-04 5.05306E-03
WNC* .09907 .05501
SATL .09935 .07943
ESC .03924 .07920
WSC -.04306 .06240
constant*** 9.44658 .96465
*3 II .60676 ****
r 2=
N = 82
.64740
* Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** at
the .025 level; *** at the .005 level; **** at the
.0005 level (one-tailed tests).
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population graduated from college (PCTBS) remained 
statistically significant.
Empirical Model, Estimates, and Results:
Teacher Employment 
As indicated, the derived demand for labor in the 
public sector is a function of the cost of labor, the 
presence of a union, the community's "taste" for the 
service, and the community's abi1ity to pay. Because 
teachers' unions affect wages, and wages affect 
employment, teachers' unions have both direct and 
indirect effects on employment. To estimate the total 
effects of teachers' unions on employment, the reduced 
form of the employment equation was estimated.
The reduced form employment equation includes all 
the independent variables in equation 1 (Valletta, 
1989). The reduced form equation for employment can be 
written as:
(equation 2) InTEACH = f (InPCI, HOUSING, PCTBS,
ENDORSE, CBA, InOPW, UNEMP, NONWHITE, 
POP, PCTUNION, WNC, SATL, ESC, WSC)
+ e .
Equat ion 2 was est imat ed us ing the natural log of the 
number of teachers employed by the schoo1 district 
(1nTEACH) as the dependent var i abie in the m u 11 ip1e 
regression analysis. Ordinary least squares was used
to obtain estimators of the regression parameters. The 
ordinary least squares regression results for equation 
2 are presented in Table 6.2.
The results indi cat e that the presence of a 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) significantly 
affected the number of teachers employed in the 
district. The average number of teachers employed in 
the district having a collective bargaining agreement 
is approximately 39 percent higher than the average 
number of teachers employed in districts which do not 
bargain. This finding supports the notion that public 
sector unions are able to increase the demand for 
educational services.
The endorsement of school board candidates 
(ENDORSE) was not significantly related to the 
employment of teachers in the school district. The 
municipal population (POP), the percentage of unionized 
workers in the state (PCTUNION), the unemployment rate 
for the municipality (UNEMP), and the average hourly 
wage of manufacturing production workers in the 
municipality (InOPW) positively and significantly 
affect employment.
Stepwise regression analysis yielded similar 
results and are reported in Appendix C. The effect of 
the presence of a collective bargaining contract, 
however, was decreased to approximately 36 percent.
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Table 6.2. Ordinary Least Squares Coefficient
Estimates for InTEACH Equation.
Variable Beta Standard Error
InPCI .17266 . 53455
HOUSING 1.26965E-05 8.97832E-06
PCTBS 7.74791E-03 .01093
ENDORSE 1.32399E-03 .04062
CBA*** .39184 .14839
InOPW*** .95580 .33078
UNEMP* .11864 .06874
NONWHITE 3.11030E-03 3.59976E-03
POP** 7.80185E-07 3.85711E-07
PCTUNION* .05022 .02533
WNC .25515 .27487
SATL .20023 .37913
ESC** .98319 .38337
WSC*** .97503 .31439
constant -.20409 4.85051
F = 2.98327 ***
r 2=
N = 82
.40250
* Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** at
the .025 level; *** at the .005 level; **** at the
.0005 level (one-tailed tests).
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Empirical Model, Estimates, and Results:
Expendi tures
The reduced form expenditures equation included 
all of the independent variables in equation 1 
(Valletta, 1989). The reduced form equation for 
expendi tures can be wr i t ten a s :
(equation 3) InEXPEND = f (InPCI, HOUSING, PCTBS,
ENDORSE, CBA, InOPW, UNEMP, NONWHITE, 
POP, PCTUNION, W N C , SATL, ESC, WSC)
+ e .
The per-pupil expenditure of a school district is 
expected to be positively associated with the presence 
of a collective bargaining' agreement (CBA), and also 
the endorsement of school board candidates by teachers 
unions (ENDORSE). The ordinary least squares results 
for per-pupil expenditures are presented in Table 6.3.
The presence of a collective bargaining agreement 
(CBA) had a significant, post ive effect on per-pupil 
expenditures (InEXPEND). The average per-pupil 
expenditures in school districts with collective 
bargaining agreements is over 9 percent higher than the 
average of school districts without collective 
bargaining agreements. The only other variable having 
a significant effect on district expenditures is the 
average wage of manufacturing production workers in the 
municipality (InOPW).
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Table 6.3. Ordinary Least Squares Coefficient
Estimates for InEXPEND Equation.
Variable Beta Standard Error
InPCI .18505 .18251
HOUSING -9.30040E-07 3.11966E-06
PCTBS 1.53198E-03 3.72535E-03
ENDORSE .01914 .01390
CBA* .09093 .05072
InOPW**** .40685 .10999
UNEMP -9.96147E-03 .02318
NONWHITE -3.28956E-04 1.23602E-03
POP -1.13652E-07 1.58307E-07
PCTUNION -8.68731E-03 8.38575E-03
WNC .08979 .08964
SATL .13968 .12749
ESC -.06669 .13073
WSC -.04697 .10329
constant*** 5.72756 1.68265
II .21686 ****
r 2=
N = 82
.54144
* Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** at
the .025 level; *** at the .005 level; **** at the
.0005 level (one-tailed tests).
Stepwise regression analysis, reported in Appendix 
D, were conducted which estimated significant effects 
on per-pupil expenditures (InEXPEND) for the following 
variables: the average wage of manufacturing
production workers in the municipality (InOPW), and the 
per-capi ta income of the municipal residents (InPCI), 
and the presence of a collective bargaining agreement 
(CBA). Additionally, this analysis estimates the 
effects of a collective bargaining agreement on per- 
pupil expenditures to be approximately 9 percent.
Di scuss ion
The results of the ordinary least squares 
estimates indicate that the presence of a collective 
bargaining agreement in large school districts in the 
eleven states without favorable collective bargaining 
legislation has a significant effect on teachers wages 
estimated to be approximately 9 percent. This finding 
is similar to previous studies on the impact of 
collective bargaining on teachers' wages (Cooper, 1982; 
Cresswell & Spargo, 1980; Lipsky, 1982). Since the 
majority of these school districts first negotiated 
collective bargaining contracts during the 1960s and 
1970s, this would suggest that teachers' unions made 
consistent demands for wage increases during contract 
negot iat ions.
The endorsement of school board candidates by 
teachers' unions occurs more often in school districts 
with collective bargaining agreements. Overall, 
however, the endorsement of school board candidates by 
teachers unions did not statistically affect teachers' 
wages. This would indicate that the decision of a 
teachers' union to endorse school board candidates is 
difficult to predict, and the results of such 
endorsements are equa11y unpredi ctable.
As evidenced by the statistically significant 
effect of opportunity wages on the wages of teachers, 
school districts are affected by the average wage 
earning ability of workers in the community. Since 
school districts compete for workers in the community 
with other businesses, wages must be competitive in 
order to obtain a significant number of workers. On 
the other hand, voters compare salaries of teachers 
with other services, such as fire and police, as well 
as with their own salaries, when deciding to vote on 
tax measures. These political, business, and 
socioeconomic factors affect teachers' wages.
The significant, but unexpected negative 
association between the percentage of population which 
have graduated from college and the yearly salary of 
teachers is noted. There is no theoretical reason, 
however, to explain this finding.
With regard to employment, the results indicate 
that the presence of a collective bargaining agreement 
has a significant effect of approximately 39 percent on 
the number of teachers employed in the school district. 
The ordinary least squares estimates of the reduced 
form employment effects are similar to effects reported 
by Trejo (1991) for police and fire departments. As 
with past research, the OL3 est imates in this study 
assumed the presence of a col 1ect ive bargaining 
agreement to be exogenous; these results may be biased 
than if a simultaneous equat ions mode 1 were est imated.
Overal1, it appears teachers' uni ons are able to 
shift the demand for 1abor thus enabling them to 
increase both wages and employment. Teachers uni ons 
are expected to accomplish this through the endorsement 
of schoo1 board candidates but these f indings indi cate 
that endorsement of school board candidates did not 
significant 1y increase employment levels.
In fact, increased teacher emp1oyment may be a 
result of the negot iat ion process in which teachers' 
unions request addi t ional benef its for t eachers whi ch 
affect both wages and employment rates. Employment of 
teachers is affected by factors which are tradi t ionally 
bargained for such as pianning t ime, class size, and 
student enrichment or remediation programs. Overall, 
these provisions in collective bargaining contracts
necessitate the employment of additional personnel. 
These provisions, however, are presented to 
constituents as improvements in the educational 
program, and are further justified by appealing to the 
belief that these programs positively impact student 
achi evement.
The empirical results indicate that collective 
bargaining does have a statistically significant effect 
on per-pupil expenditures. These results are similar 
to Chambers (1977) who argued that the very existence 
of a collective bargaining contract may affect the 
preferences of decision makers with regard to 
educational services. That is, since teachers 
recognize that larger school budgets lead to greater 
benefits, the union will attempt to exert every 
possible influence on the demand for educational 
quality and, hence, on school district budget 
dec is i ons.
CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Summary
This study examined the extent of teachers' unions 
activities in the eleven states without favorable 
collective bargaining legislation and the impact of 
collective bargaining agreements on teachers' wages, 
employment, and per-pupil expenditures. Specifically, 
public school districts in Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Kentucky, Louisiana and New Mexico were selected 
because legislation authorizes school districts to 
enter into collective bargaining, but does not require 
school districts to do so. School districts in 
Mississippi, Missouri, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming 
were included because there is no legislative provision 
concerning collective bargaining for teachers. School 
districts were selected based on student enrolIments of 
over 10,000.
A two-phased methodology was used to address the 
research quest ions. Phase 1 was a quali tat ive study 
whi ch examined aspects of the school district and 
teachers' union 1abor relat ions. This study uti1ized 
data from a survey of school superintendents in 
selected districts in order to obtain factual 
information concerning labor relations between 
teachers' unions and the school board. Survey
instruments were distributed to 106 school 
superintendents of which 83 responded. Data from 82 
districts were analyzed. Phase 2 was a quantitative 
study using multiple regression techniques to examine 
the statistical relationship between teachers’ union 
activities and teachers' wages, employment rates, and 
per-pupil expenditures. Government publications 
provided additional district demographics and economic 
data.
The results of the qualitative study indicate that 
teachers' unions are actively engaged in collective 
bargaining with school boards even though school boards 
are not required by law to do so. Approximately thirty 
percent of the school districts engage in collective 
bargaining negotiations with the majority of collective 
bargaining contracts first being negotiated during the 
1960s and 1970s. Since that time, school districts 
have received fewer requests from teachers' unions for 
certification elections and have been more reluctant to 
allow certification elections to be held after 
receiving requests.
In contrast, however, membership data and the 
rating by superintendents of teachers' level of concern 
for four financial and five educational reform issues 
suggest that the demand for services provided by 
teachers' unions exists. Teachers' concerns over
issues such as wages and job security as reported by 
superintendents are greater in districts not presently 
governed by collective bargaining agreements than in 
districts wi th collective bargaining agreements.
The survey results also indicate that teachers' 
unions in districts with collective bargaining and, to 
a large degree, without collective bargaining, engage 
in political endorsements of school board candidates. 
The poli t ical activi t ies of teachers 1 unions may 
contribute to the establishment of cooperative 
relationships between teachers' unions and school 
boards.
Phase 2 of the study utilized multiple regression 
analysis to examine the effects of collective 
bargaining on teachers' wages, employment rates, and 
per-pupil expenditures in these districts. The 
empirical results indicate that collective bargaining 
has a significant, positive effect on wages, estimated 
to be approximately 9 percent. The effect of a 
collective bargaining contract on employment rates was 
estimated to be approximately 39 percent. The effect 
of collective bargaining on per-pupil expenditures was 
found less statistically significant and was estimated 
to be approximately 9 percent. The effect of 
endorsements by teachers' unions of school board
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candidates, however, was statistically insignificant in 
the three equations.
Potential for Union Growth
The potential for teachers' union growth in the 
states without favorable collective bargaining 
legislation centers on the demand for union services by 
teachers, the resistance by school boards to unions, 
and the poss ibi1i ty of a change in legislation whi ch 
would require school boards to bargain with teachers.
Teachers' unions were first organized to address 
common concerns such as the establishment of tenure 
rights, legitimate salary schedules, and retirement 
programs. Union activities were initially successful 
in obtaining remedies for these concerns. Therefore, 
in order for union demand to continue after 
successfully obtaining objectives, events must occur 
which serve to initiate teachers' concerns such that 
the demand for union services will continue. 
Superintendents reported that three broad issues were 
important to the growth in union membership within 
their districts: (1) wages, (2) job security, and (3)
a voice in administrative decisions.
Superintendents rated the teachers' level of 
concern with salaries as the highest of nine 
educational issues. The average salary paid to
teachers varies considerably from state to state, as 
well as from district to district within a state, which 
results in teachers comparing salary levels to other 
teachers, both at the national and state level. 
Teachers' decisions to join a union may be based on 
either cognitive dissonance theory or utility theory 
which focuses on whether joining the union can result 
in the desired increase in wages. Since the present 
average t eachers' salary in the e 1 even states wi thout 
favorable collective bargaining legislation is lower 
when compared to other states, teachers who recognize 
these differences may choose to join a union which 
could increase the demand for union services.
Additionally, superintendents reported that 
teachers' levels of concern in changes in working 
conditions such as teacher evaluation programs, student 
testing, teacher certification, and curriculum 
innovations were higher in districts without collective 
bargaining than in districts with collective 
bargaining. This reflects the belief that teachers may 
enjoy a greater sense of job security toward changes in 
working conditions as a result of a collective 
bargaining agreement. Two factors contribute to this 
"voice" benefit of union membership: (1) teachers'
unions lobby legislators in an effort to shape and 
influence new legislation, and (2) union officials
provide data and information to support the union 
positions. Since many states have enacted educational 
legislation which affect working conditions, the demand 
for union services should continue when teachers 
perceive the union as capable of providing job 
security.
School boards, however, may continue to deny 
certification elections to teachers' unions as 
evidenced number of certification elections recently 
held in the surveyed districts. School boards can 
implement managerial practices which alter labor 
relations within a district and affect the demand for 
union services. For example, the establishment of 
site-based management with a teacher advisory committee 
would establish a means for teacher "voice" which could 
reduce the demand for union services.
The enactment of duty-to-bargain legislation which 
would require school boards to bargain with teachers' 
unions remains a possibility in the remaining ten 
states since New Mexico presently has a duty-to-bargain 
law. Bills have been introduced in the Louisiana 
legislature which would require school districts to 
bargain with teachers' unions, but these laws have not 
been enacted. The governor, who was endorsed by the 
teachers' unions, has indicated he would sign a bill
mandating duty to bargain if adopted by the 
Legislature.
In summary, this study examined the extent of 
teachers' unions activities in large public school 
districts in the eleven states without favorable 
collective bargaining legislation. The key findings of 
this study are that superintendents' perception of 
teachers' concerns suggest that the demand for union 
services should continue, and that the presence of a 
collective bargaining agreement between a school board 
and a teachers' union significantly affect teachers' 
wages, employment rates, and per-pupil expenditures.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT
June 28,1992
Dr. Charles Hundley 
Superintendent 
Abilene ISD 
P.O. Box 981 
Abilene, TX 79604-0981
Dear Dr. Hundley:
Imagine that due to changes in state law, your district 
would be required to change the present labor relations 
with the teachers' union in your district. Your 
district, unlike the majority of school districts 
throughout the nation, operates within a legal 
structure which presently does not require or prohibit 
collective bargaining agreements with teachers' unions. 
The purpose of this project is to determine the present 
level of teachers' organization, the frequency of 
request by teachers' unions to enter into collective 
bargaining, and the school board's response to such 
request.
Your school district's response is very important since 
your district was selected due to your district's large 
student population which prior research has indicated 
to have a high correlation to union growth. The 
instrument has been piloted with a sample of school 
superintendents and has been designed to require a 
minimum of time.
It will be appreciated if you will complete the 
enclosed form prior to July 15th and return it in the 
stamped envelope which is enclosed. I welcome any 
additional comments you may have concerning the study. 
Your responses, however, will be held in strict 
confidence. All districts responding to the survey 
will receive a summary of the results of the study. 
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
Malcolm M. Duplantis 
Ph.D. Candidate
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Code_____
SCHOOL DISTRICT’S LABOR RELATIONS SURVEY
Please answer the following questions regarding 
your school system's labor relationship with teachers.
1. Has a teachers' union requested that a 
certification election be held to determine the union's 
right to represent teachers in negotiations with the 
school board?
No . Please proceed to Question 7.
______Yes, if so when: 19___ , and
by which national teachers' organization 
American Federation of Teachers 
 National Education Association
2. Has the school board authorized a certification 
election with teachers as the bargaining unit?
 _No, school board refused to allow
certification election. PI ease proceed 
to Ques t ion 7.
 _ N o , but voluntarily recognized union as
bargaining agent wi thout a certification 
elect ion. PI ease proceed to Quest ion 6.
Yes. if so when: 19_____. What were the
results of the e l e c t i o n : ______________
3. After the request for collective bargaining but 
prior to the certification election, did school board 
members, supervisors, and principals receive inservice 
training concerning collective bargaining?
______No
.Yes - If so, on what topics:
116
4. After the request for collective bargaining but 
prior to the certification election, was printed 
1iterature distributed to teachers concerning benefits 
provided by the district without union representation?
  No
Yes - If so, what benefi ts were 
explained
5. After the request for collective bargaining but 
prior to the certification elect ion, did the school 
district eaaploy a labor relations consultant or 
attorney?
 No
______Yes
6. Has the school board entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with the teachers union?
  No
______Yes - if so when: 19____ .
7. Teachers' union growth in a school district is 
often associated with a critical or key incident which 
results in a large nunber of teachers becoming involved 
in union activity. PI ease describe such an event if 
this did occur in your district.
8. What national teachers' organization is the 
majority of the teachers in the district a member?
_____ American Federat ion of Teachers (AFT)
_____ Nat ional Education Association (NEA)
.Other, please specify name
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9. Has the teachers' union engaged in a teachers' 
strike?
 No
Yes - If so in what years?
What was the major issue concerning the
strike?
10. Has the teachers' union ever endorsed a candidate 
for school board?
_____ No
_____ Yes -
If yes9 on average how active has the 
teachers' union been in endorsing school board 
candidates?
(Circle one)
Extremely Somewhat Extremely
Inactive Active Active
1 2 3 4 5
11. In general, how would you characterize the 
relationship between your school board and the 
teachers' organization? (Circle one)
Highly Neutral Highly
Cooperative Adversarial
1 2 3 4 5
12. Please describe your district during the 1991-92 
school year according to the following:
_________________ Total number of teachers
____________Total number of Black teachers
 _______________Total number of male teachers
______________ Average teacher's salary
________ ________ Per Pupil Expenditure
_________________ Number of School Board Members
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13. Has your district implemented a reduction-in-force 
policy affecting teachers?
No
_____ Yes - If so, what year(s)
^ m t m — mmnmmj m m m m _ ■ a n  *
14. Has your district implemented salary reduction or 
"freezes"?
_____ No
_____ Yes - If so, in what year(s)?
14. Please rate the "level of concern" of teachers in 
your school district concerning the following 
educational issues (1 would indicate very low level 
concern while 5 would indicate a very high level of 
concern).
Low High
New teacher certification requirements 1 2 3 4 5
Teacher evaluation programs 1 2 3 4 5
Teacher's salaries 1 2 3 4 5
Curriculum issues 1 2 3 4 5
Student testing 1 2 3 4 5
Teacher benefits
(insurance, leave policy) 1 2 3 4 5
Declining revenue in district 1 2 3 4 5
Pupi1/teacher ratio 1 2 3 4 5
America 2000 1 2 3 4 5
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16. What changes in legislation, if any, in the 
present state statutes concerning collective bargaining 
do you anticipate?
17.Comments:
Please complete the following information concerning 
yourself:
Name______________________________________________
Pos i t i on__________ _____ ________________________ _
Telephone Number i  )
Please return the completed form in the postage-paid, 
reply envelope. Thank you very much for your 
cooperation, and please be assured of the anonymity of 
your responses.
Malcolm M. Duplantis 
106 Fence Row 
Schriever, La. 70395 
(504) 868-4267
APPENDIX B
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR
InWAGE EQUATION USING STEPWISE METHOD
Var i abl e_________ Beta____________________ Standard Error
HOUSING*** 2.99570E-06 1.04592E-06
PCTBS* -2.99956E-03 1. 68805E.03
CBA*** .08960 .02664
InOPW**** .24285 .05977
WNC* .08287 .03776
wsc*** -.10216 .03471
constant
F = 17,21709 ****
R 2= .61017
N = 82
* Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** at
the .025 level; *** at the .005 level; **** at the 
.0005 level (one-tailed tests).
1 2 0
APPENDIX C
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR
InTEACH EQUATION USING STEPWISE METHOD
Var i able Beta Standard Error
HOUSING** 1.20829E-05 5.20882E-06
CBA*** .36739 .13350
1nOPW * * * * 1.03718 .29063
UNEMP* .10429 .05821
POP** 7.24430E-07 3.55327E-07
PCTUNION** .04153 .01728
ESC*** .84471 .25596
WSC**** .81922 .21073
cons t ant 1.90731 1.10486
F = 5.03723 ****
r 2=
N = 82
.37210
* Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** at 
the .025 level; *** at the .005 level; **** at the 
.0005 level (one-tailed tests).
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APPENDIX D
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR
InEXPEND EQUATION USING STEPWISE METHOD
Variable Beta Standard :
InPCI * .22053 .10421
CBA* .09522 .04425
InOPW**** .38497 .09762
WNC* .11567 .05602
SATL* . 16748 .08485
constant**** 5.18026 .94178
F = 12.48288 ****
R2= .51406
N = 82
* Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** at
the .025 level; **# at the .005 level; **#* at the
.0005 level (one-tailed tests).
1 2 2
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